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A TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE: EVERYTHING YOU
ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT RICO
BEFORE YOUR CASE WAS DISMISSED
MARK E. DUVALt
The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is a
complicated and powerful cause of action. In addition to criminal
penalties, RICO provides a civil cause of action for victims of organ-
ized criminal activities, white collar crime, and garden variety fraud.
Treble damages and attorney's fees provide sufficient incentive for
plaintiffs to aid the government in the fight against organized crime.
This Article is a pragmatic guide to attorneys in bringing a cause of
action under RICO.
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INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), instills fear in many defense-oriented civil litigators.
RICO is also heralded by plaintiff's attorneys as a much
needed panacea to aggrieved fraud victims.' Whatever the
reader's perspective, RICO provokes controversy and is a fas-
cinating tool to the civil litigator representing a wide variety of
fraud victims. 2 This Article addresses how to litigate a RICO
1. See Nathan, Civil RICO: A Primer on the Emerging Use and Abuse of an Elastic Treble
Damage Remedy, RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGA-
TION Tab F-2, at 1-2 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1985); see also, Horn, "Civil RICO Action:
Weapon for Business Victims," LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON 38 (Jan. 19, 1981).
2. As Professor Blakey has stated:
Congress found that "organized" criminal "activity" used "fraud" to
"drain" "dollars" from the American economy and to "harm innocent in-
vestors." Congress, therefore, passed RICO to "provid[e] enhanced sanc-
tions and new remedies." "Nothing on the face of... [RICO] suggests a
congressional intent to limit its coverage .... "
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action In Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 237, 247-48 (1982) (citations omitted).
Congress, in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922-23 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)) stated:
[Vol. 12
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lawsuit by discussing the multiple definitions RICO has been
given, suggesting pleading techniques, making discovery rec-
ommendations, and reviewing courtroom tactics used at trial.
In dissecting the words which comprise the acronym
"RICO," it is evident that strong language is employed. The
use of the word "racketeer" suggests that RICO's provisions
are aimed at gangsters, mafioso types, loan sharks, profes-
sional arsonists, and the like.3 That proposition, although
true, is also inadequate. RICO was enacted by Congress to
eradicate the pernicious effects of organized and white collar
crime in this country.4 Regardless of any individual perspec-
tive, RICO was purposefully enacted to apply to a vast array of
fraudulent activity. RICO empowers civil litigants to bring
"garden variety" business fraud claims that have never before
been afforded a federal forum. 5
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and wide-spread activity that annually
drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and
illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a ma-
jor portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeav-
ors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property,
the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs,
and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increas-
ingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and
to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activi-
ties in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic sys-
tem, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce,
threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the
Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because
of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the devel-
opment of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and
other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those en-
gaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available
to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gather-
ing process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing en-
hanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.
Id.
RICO potentially applies to a wealth of fraudulent activity normally not cogniza-
ble in federal court. See generally Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriet' of
Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1103-05 (1982) (discussing judicial inter-
pretations narrowing RICO).
3. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 250-52 n.41 (discussion of import and seriousness
of word "racketeer").
4. See id. at 249; Moran, Pleading a Civil Rico Action 'nder Section 1962(c): Conflict-
ing Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemmna, 57 TEMP. L.Q 731, 731 (1984).
5. See Moran, supra note 4, at 731.
1986]
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RICO has encountered hostility from the bench and bar in
the short tenure in which it has been actively used by praction-
ers." Judicial criticism seems predominantly motivated by the
potential RICO has for significantly expanding federal jurisdic-
tion and, hence, federal court dockets across the nation. 7 A
crafty litigator can allege a marginal RICO count and become
entitled to federal jurisdiction on a traditionally state cause of
action for fraud. At least one court has complained that there
is now a "RICO bar" prosecuting civil RICO claims. 8 The in-
centive for using federal courts will continue to exist until state
legislatures enact similar treble damage legislation.
RICO is also denounced for a variety of other reasons. The
most frequently cited reason is the belief that Congress did not
intend it to reach such a broad array of commercial activity.-
Some courts have presented a convoluted and tortured expose
on the legislative history of RICO in a futile attempt to argue
that it was not intended to be so broad and should be narrowly
construed."' Some commentators and courts are advocating
unadulterated judicial legislation. I
RICO is, despite popular belief, well-tailored and crafted.
Its scope is ostensibly broad because it seeks to affect organ-
ized crime. "Organized crime" is a difficult phrase to define,
and Congress did not want to shackle federal prosecutors or
private attorneys general with an unworkable statute that
6. See id.
7. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 389-90
(7th Cir. 1984), afd per curiam, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
8. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482,486 (2d Cir. 1984), revd, 105 S.
Ct. 3275 (1985).
9. See Moran, supra note 4, at 733-34; Bradley, Racketeers. Copgress, and the Corts:
An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 892-93 (1980); Tarlow. RICO Revisited 17
GA. L. REV. 291, 293-95 (1983); Weinberg, Vother of God, is this the End of RICO . 1983
A.B.A. J. 130, 130-3 1. But see Wexler, Civil RICO Coiiies of Age: Some .1laturational
Problems and Proposalfor Reform, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1983).
For criticisms lodged against RICO as it currently exists and the debate being
waged for its legislative reform, see DuVal, RICO's Congressional History aid Fthure.
RICO RICO EVERYWHERE!, Section I, at 11-22 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ. Nov.
1985). Three bills are currently pending before Congress to amend RICO. Id. at 13-
18.
10. See, e.g., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-504; In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F.
Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1I. See Note supra note 2, at 1103-05; Brown, RICO Repercussions: Sedima aid
Haroco, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 282 (1985) (comparing the Second and Seventh Circuits'
approach to RICO and its legislative history).
[Vol. 12
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would not meaningfully enhance prosecution and civil judg-
ments against those benefiting from the fruits of crime.12 By
enacting RICO, Congress deliberately chose to use the drag-
net approach, rather than merely handing the prosecutor or
civil litigator a fishing pole.
RICO's application is not disturbing when one considers
that organized crime operates in many spheres and is not lim-
ited to loan sharking, gambling, and store front extortion.
RICO has to be flexible and chameleon-like to apply to these
situations. The criticism that RICO should not apply to "ordi-
nary fraud" is troublesome since white collar crime does not
receive enough attention in this country. As any civil litigator
dealing regularly in business fraud, bankruptcy, securities, and
loan transactions can report, business fraud is a serious and
somewhat accepted way of life in the United States.' 3 RICO
punishes only the most egregious of those fraudulent activities
because to prove its elements requires more than just the pres-
entation of a fraud case.
Many of RICO's detractors base their complaints on the
over-expansive interpretation they believed RICO was being
given by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Detractors
sided with the interpretation given RICO's provisions by a tril-
12. Congress deliberately chose not to include a definition of"organized crime"
in RICO since it would have unnecessarily narrowed the scope of the Act and would
have created a violation of criminal laws based on one's status. Such a classification is
constitutionally suspect. See 116 CONG. REC. H35,293 (1970) (statement of Rep.
Poff); see also DuVal, supra note 10, at 9-10; Comment, Civil RICO: The Resolution ojlhe
Racketeering Enterpiise Injuy Requirement, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 364, 370-71 (1985).
Senator Hruska described RICO as attacking the economic power of organized
crime on two fronts; criminal and civil. He considered the civil provision the more
important feature of the bill. "[Tihe criminal provisions are intended primarily as an
adjunct to the civil provisions which I consider as the more important feature of the
bill . . . . I believe that the time has arrived for innovation in the organized crime
fight." 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (statement of Sen. Hruska).
13. In 1974 the United States Chamber of Commerce conducted a comprehen-
sive study of the direct economic cost of fraud in our society. The resulting costs are:
Types of Fraid Billions of Dollars
1. Bankruptcy Fraud .08
2. Bribery, Kickbacks, and Payoffs 3.00
3. Consumer Fraud 21.00
4. Embezzlement 7.00
5. Insurance Fraud 2.00
6. Receiving Stolen Property 3.50
7. Securities Theft and Fraud 4.00
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S PROB-
LEM, EVERYONE'S Loss 6 (1974).
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ogy of cases in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.' 4 The
Second Circuit's reading of RICO and its legislative history
was so narrow that it essentially emasculated RICO's utility as
a statute designed to combat the infiltration of legitimate busi-
nesses by organized crime.' 5 The Seventh Circuit's position is
that RICO is necessarily broad and must reach a wide variety
of conduct to effectively reach the multifarious activities into
which organized crime is now involved. RICO, it is argued,
essentially deputizes private attorney's general who assist the
federal government in fighting organized crime by prosecuting
civil RICO lawsuits.1 6 The civil litigant is induced to assist the
government by the lure of treble damages, attorneys' fees,
costs, and disbursements to the successful plaintiff. 17
The debate ended recently when the United States Supreme
Court decided the Second Circuit case of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 18 and the Seventh Circuit case of Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can National Bank & Trust Co. '9 The Court basically adopted the
interpretation given RICO by the Seventh Circuit. The
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's reading of RICO
which required that a plaintiff show that the defendant had
previously committed a criminal RICO offense before a civil
RICO action could be prosecuted. The Court also rejected the
requirement that a plaintiff establish the fact that it had suf-
fered a competitive injury separate and apart from the injury
arising from the underlying predicate acts enumerated in
RICO.
14. Sedima, 741 F.2d 482; Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984);
Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984). Petitions for certiorari were filed in
both Bankers Trust and Furman, but the Supreme Court withheld action on the peti-
tions pending the Sedima decision.
15. See'Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-504; Moran, supra note 4, at 733-34. In Haroco,
the Seventh Circuit stated:
We do not believe we could limit RICO in the ways argued by the Sec-
ond Circuit without disturbing the policy choices the Congress has made. If
the safety or stability of the Republic demanded, we might be justified in
pursuing an aggressive jurisprudence. But, particularly at the pleading
stage, we seem to be dealing with much smaller stakes-legal fees and the
sensibilities of prominent defendants alleged to be "racketeers." Those
stakes do not justify our rejecting Congress's choice of a statute that sweeps
broadly.
Haroco, 747 F.2d at 399.
16. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392, 398-99.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
18. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
19. American Nat'l Bank Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
[Vol. 12
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At this point in time, RICO has survived judicial scrutiny and
remains a potent weapon to the civil litigant representing vic-
tims of fraud and business torts. RICO's next challenge to its
existence comes at the congressional level where many have
been clamoring for Congress to legislatively restrict RICO's
broad and sweeping provisions.
This Article does not purport to survey RICO's legislative
history since the world of legal academia has thoroughly re-
viewed this area.20 This Article will address the pragmatic side
of pleading, proving, and litigating a RICO case. First, this Ar-
ticle will examine RICO definitions and their importance in
bringing a RICO suit. Second, the definitions will be applied
in drafting an effective complaint. Third, procedural consider-
ations will be explored. Fourth, the problems RICO poses in
discovery will be explained. Finally, certain trial tactics will be
presented.
I. RICO DEFINITIONS
There are several interpretational variations in RICO which
produce the most controversy among federal courts. In ana-
lyzing the statute, it is evident that it has adopted its own lexi-
con. The words and phrases "enterprise," "person,"
"racketeering activity," and "pattern of racketeering activity"
are important components of RICO. Most of the debate cen-
ters around the interpretation of various definitions. Section
1964(a) sets up the statute's basic applicability:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter [18 U.S.C.
§ 1962] may sue therefore in any appropriate United States
20. Professor Blakey capsulizes RICO's legislative history in the following way:
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO ap-
plied beyond any limiting concept like "organized crime" or "racketeering";
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust stat-
utes, so that it would not be limited by antitrust test concepts like "competi-
tive," "commercial," or "direct or indirect" injury;
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing or-
ganizations were contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and
other relief;
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations
and crowded court dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the gen-
eral field of commercial and other fraud; and
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal
criminal and civil remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law
fraud.
Blakey, supra note 2, at 280 (emphasis in original).
1986]
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district court and shall recover three fold the damages he
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee.
2'
In addition to authorizing recovery of treble damages as a
civil remedy, RICO also allows equitable remedies including
injunctions, divestitures, and dissolutions to restrain violations
of its substantive provisions. 22  It is unclear at this time
whether equitable relief is available to private litigants. Equita-
ble relief, however, is available to the federal government in
civil actions. 23 The Eighth Circuit has declined to answer
whether private litigants are entitled to equitable relief and the
Fourth Circuit has expressed doubts.2 4 Despite the apparent
ambiguity that exists, several courts have already indicated that
private litigants may obtain equitable relief under the auspices
of RICO. -5 The confusion stems from a reading of subsections
(c) and (b) of section 1964.
Subsection (c) of section 1964 creates the private right of
action under RICO, but lists treble damages as its only rem-
edy.2  Subsection (b) empowers the United States Attorney
General's office to try civil suits and expressly permits equita-
ble actions.2 7 The question devolves whether Congress also
intended to extend equitable remedies to private litigants.
RICO prohibits several types of activities which are actiona-
ble under its provisions. The three basic activities are: (1) in-
vestment in an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce of income obtained through a pattern of
racketeering activity or through a collection of an unlawful
debt;28 (2) acquisition of an interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an un-
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
22. Id. § 1964.
23. Id. § 1964(b). It is unclear if RICO's equitable remedies are available to pri-
vate litigants. See supra notes 139 and accompanying text.
24. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290 (4th Cir. 1983); Bennett v.
Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir.), modified, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1982), cerl.
deniedsub nor., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
25. See, e.g., DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1378. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (equitable restitution); see also United States v. Barber, 476 F. Supp. 182, 189
(S.D. W. Va. 1979) (dissolution and divestiture appropriate in some circumstances);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1021 (D. Md. 1976) (divestiture and for-
feiture available remedies under RICO).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
27. Id. § 1964(b).
28. Id. § 1962(a).
[Vol. 12
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lawful debt; - and (3) conducting the affairs of such an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering or through collection
of an unlawful debt.30 A conspiracy to commit any of the
above three offenses is the fourth actionable provision found
in the statute. 3' Since the first and second activities require
proof of tracing laundered money to legitimate businesses, it is
a difficult and onerous task to prove at trial. Many litigators,
therefore, have chosen to proceed under section 1962(c), seek-
ing to prove that the defendant has conducted the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering or through collec-
tion of an unlawful debt.
Laying out section 1962 into its constituent parts, the follow-
ing elements are found:
1. A person (as defined in section 1961(3));
2. Employed or associated with;
3. An enterprise (section 1961(4));
4. Which enterprise is engaged in, or the activities of
which enterprise affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce; and
5. A person employed by or associated with the enter-
prise conducts or participates in the enterprise's affairs;
6. Through a pattern (section 1961(5));
7. Of racketeering activity (section 1961(1)).32
Distilling RICO to its core, one must prove that a person has
invested in, acquired, or conducted an enterprise by means of
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt. Each of these terms present interesting inter-
pretational problems.
A. Enterprise
Section 1961(4) defines enterprise to include any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact. Courts
have interpreted enterprise to include almost any combination
of individuals or organizations. Enterprises may include labor
unions, 33' partnerships, 34 foreign corporations, 35 groups of
29. Id. § 1962(b).
30. Id. § 1962(c).
31. Id. § 1962(d). For a discussion of conspiracy under RICO, see Nathan, supra
note 1, at 14-15.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1962; see Nathan, supra note 1, at 6-14.
33. See. e.g., United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 937 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied.
1986]
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corporations,36 and units of government. 37 This interpretation
has ostensibly broadened RICO's application.
One of the first milestones RICO achieved in being inter-
preted was to shed the idea that it applied only to illegitimate
enterprises. 38 Some courts reasoned that an association of in-
dividuals for illicit purposes could be deemed an "enterprise"
under the statute. 39 The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Turkette,4° resolved the dispute by holding that an enterprise
embraces both legitimate and illegitimate associations. 4  The
Court in Turkette followed RICO's mandate that "provisions of
this Title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."
42
Turkette clarified an additional problem associated with the
definition of "enterprise." The Seventh Circuit, construing
RICO too liberally, interpreted "enterprise" by suggesting
that an enterprise could be the pattern of offenses. 43  The
460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom., 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Gibson, 486 F.
Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
34. 18 U.S.C. 1961(4); Nathan, supra note 1, at 7.
35. See Liman, Civil RICO: An Overview, RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN Busi-
NESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, Tab F-3, at 13 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1985)
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 1981) (state civil
court), cert. denied sub nom., Ribotskv v. United States, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); United
States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1092 (3d Cir. 1977) (local regulatory board), cerl.
denied sub non., Sills v. United States, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Brown,
555 F.2d 407, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1977) (local police department), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
904 (1978). But see United States v. Thompson, 669 F.2d 1143, 1145 (6th Cir. 1982)
(office of governor not an "enterprise").
38. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1979) (bur-
glary ring); United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978) (prostitution
ring); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub non.,
Napoli v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (band of gamblers).
40. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
41. Id. at 585.
42. See id. at 587, quoting, 84 Stat. 947.
43. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). The Sixth Circuit interpreted Cappelto as allowing "the
prosecution of illegal gamblers for conducting illegal gambling through a pattern of
illegal gambling .... ." United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 269 (6th Cir. 1979).
The Sutton court pointed out why the enterprise must be separate from the pattern
offenses.
Surely their draftsman would not have opted for so complex a formulation if
the legislative purpose had been merely to proscribe racketeering, without
more. A straightforward prohibition against engaging in "patterns of racke-
[Vol. 12
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Supreme Court rejected this reasoning in Turkette and held that




Courts have not only confused enterprise with the underly-
ing pattern offenses, 4 5 they have also failed to distinguish the
"enterprise" from the "person" who commits the RICO of-
fense. Section 1961(3) defines a "person" as any individual or
entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in prop-
erty.46 RICO's language suggests that the enterprise is sepa-
rate and distinct from the person or persons who utilize the
enterprise in a forbidden manner. A RICO defendant is one
who "controls or participates" in the affairs of the enterprise,
or who "invests" or "acquires an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity."-4 7 The definition of
"person" does not only dictate who can be named as a RICO
defendant, but it also defines who qualifies as a RICO plaintiff.
Section 1964(c) operates as a proximate cause requirement in
RICO since a person can only recover if he is injured "in his
business or property." This proximate cause requirement is
discussed later in the article. 48
One of the problems frequently encountered by courts is
whether a corporation can be considered both a "person" and
an "enterprise" in a RICO suit. 49 Courts are split on this is-
teering activity" would have sufficed, and there would have been no need
for a reference to "enterprises" of any sort.
Id. at 266.
44. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 582-83.
45. Liman, supra note 35, at 14.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
47. See id. § 1962.
48. See i'fra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
49. Arthur Liman stated that a RICO enterprise must be separate from a person:
The better argument is that for the same reasons that the enterprise cannot
be the underlying pattern offenses, the enterprise cannot be the person. For
example, section 1962(c) prohibits "any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise" from conducting the enterprise's affairs through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. Because an enterprise can be an individual or
any other association, a person accused of a RICO violation could always be
identified as the enterprise, since he is always "associated with" himself. If
the defendant is both the person and the enterprise, section 1962(4) states
merely that a person who participates in a pattern of racketeering activities
violates RICO.
Liman, supra note 35, at 15 (citations omitted). Professor Blakey disagrees that the
"person" and "enterprise" must be separate. Professor Blakey states:
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sue. 5°1 For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that a corpora-
tion simultaneously cannot be both the enterprise and the
defendant in a RICO action. 5' The Eleventh Circuit disagrees,
adopting the broad reading given "enterprise" by the United
States Supreme Court in Turkette.52 Following the parity of
reasoning used to hold that an enterprise cannot also be part
of the pattern offenses, it seems clearly analogous that an en-
terprise cannot also be the person. The lanquage of RICO
supports this rationale.
53
To be sure, the text of RICO requires the showing of two separate ele-
ments: "person" and "enterprise." But nothing in this statute compels the
conclusion that the elements are mutually exclusive. Nothing on the face of
the statute, on the other hand, compels a conclusion that they are not mutu-
ally exclusive. Either reading of the statute would be consistent with its
unadorned text. The resolution of the issue, however, ought to turn on
which statutory construction is most consistent with Congress' expressed
purpose to provide "enhanced sanctions and new remedies." Obviously,
too, Congress' characterization of RICO as "remedial" and is directive that
RICO be "liberally construed" to implement that characterization ought to
be brought into play. Following that approach, the proper result should
depend on the particular relationship between the "person," "enterprise,"
and "pattern of racketeering activity" that is involved in the violation of
each of RICO's basic standards. In some situations, no objection ought to
be raised to attributing to the "enterprise" civil liability or criminal respon-
sibility for the conduct of the "person." In other situations, such an attribu-
tion would be perverse.
Blakey, snpra note 2, at 287-90 (citations omitted).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th
Cir. 1982) (a corporation cannot simultaneously be the "enterprise" and the defend-
ant in a substantive RICO charge), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Fields v. Na-
tional Republic Bank, 546 F. Supp. 123, 124 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (if the bank is
considered the enterprise then plaintiff did not identify a person); United States v.
Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) (corporation may be simultaneously both
the defendant and the enterprise), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983).
5 1. See Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d at 1190.
52. See Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988. One commentator makes the following remarks
to suggest that the language in RICO supports the idea that the enterprise must be
separate and distinct from the person.
The language of the statute suggests that the "enterprise" must also be sep-
arate and distinct from the person or persons who are manipulating the "en-
terprise" in the forbidden manner. The defendant under RICO is the
person who "conducts or participates" in the affairs of the enterprise or who
"invests" or "acquires" an interest in the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering. The statute defines person as including "any individual or en-
tity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." The defini-
tion covers not only the person who can be named as a defendant in either a
criminal or civil suit, but also the person who, "having been injured in his
business or property," may initiate a civil action.
Nathan, snpra note I, at 10-11.
53. The language of RICO does not give an obvious indication that a civil action
can proceed only after a criminal conviction. The word "conviction" does not appear
in any relevant portion of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964(c). To the
contrary, the predicate acts involve conduct that is "chargeable" or "indictable" and
[Vol. 12
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/3
TRIAL L4IilITER'S GUIDE TO RICO
C. Racketeering Activity
Racketeering activity is defined in Section 1961 as conduct
traditionally considered criminal which is "chargeable" or "in-
dictable" under state or federal law, including murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing
in narcotics or other dangerous drugs.54 Racketeering activity
also involves more commonly pled conduct such as bankruptcy
fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, and mail and wire fraud,
all of which are punishable under any law of the United
States .55
"offense[s]" that are "punishable" under various criminal statutes. Id. § 1961(1). As
defined in the statute, racketeering activity consists not of acts for which the defend-
ant has been convicted, but of acts for which he could be convicted. See also S. Rep.
No. 91-617, p. 518 (1969) "a racketeering activity . . . must be an act in itself subject
to criminal sanction." (emphasis added.) Thus, a prior conviction requirement can-
not be found in the definition of "racketeering activity," nor can it be found in sec-
tion 1962, which sets out the statute's substantive provision. Indeed, if either section
1961 or section 1962 contained such a requirement, a prior conviction would also be
a prerequisite, for a criminal prosecution, or for a civil action by the government to
enjoin violations that had not yet occurred.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Offenses of racketeering activity include:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in nar-
cotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports brib-
ery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (re-
lating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and
welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transac-
tions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information),
section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),
section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruc-
tion of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interfer-
ence with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to
racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sec-
tions 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen prop-
erty), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),
sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic); (C) any act which is indicta-
ble under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501 (c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds); or (D) any offense involving fraud con-
nected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the feloni-
ous manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or
otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under
any law of the United States . . ..
Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
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The reference to the words "chargeable," "indictable," and
"punishable" in section 1961(1) has prompted the question of
whether a person must have been convicted of the predicate
offense to be liable. This question fueled a major controversy
between the Second and Seventh Circuits. The Second Circuit
required a showing that the defendant was convicted of a pred-
icate RICO act before the plaintiff had standing to sue. 56 The
Seventh Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's view and found
that it was an unnecessary and tortured view of the statute.5
7
The United States Supreme Court recently settled this ques-
tion in Sedima,58 in which it held that a prior criminal convic-
tion requirement is not found in the definition of racketeering
activity.
The final category of RICO offenses is a conspiracy to com-
mit the offenses proscribed by the statute. 59 The case law de-
veloping in the area of conspiracy must, of necessity, be
borrowed from criminal RICO cases. The Fifth Circuit, in
United States v. Elliot,60 held that in criminal RICO cases, "[t]o
be convicted as a member of an enterprise conspiracy, an indi-
vidual, by his words or actions, must have objectively mani-
fested an agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
affairs of an enterprise through commission of two or more predicate
crimes. "6 This means that the RICO conspirator must have
agreed to commit at least two predicate acts.62
56. Id.; Sedirna, 741 F.2d at 496.
57. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 393-94. Other courts also jumped into the fray. Sev-
eral courts have allowed a civil RICO suit to be maintained without requiring that the
defendant be charged or indicted by the government for committing a crime. See,
e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.I (6th Cir. 1982);
Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. I11. 1980); Farmers Bank v. Bell
Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
58. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). The Supreme Court in Sedima held:
In sum, we can find no support in the statute's history, its language, or con-
siderations of policy for a requirement that a private treble damages action
under § 1964(c) can proceed only against a defendant who has already been
convicted. To the contrary, every indication is that no such requirement
exists.
Id. at 3284.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
60. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora., Delph v. United States, 439 U.S.
953 (1978).
61. Id. at 903 (emphasis in original).
62. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
One commentator suggests that an action based upon a conspiracy to violate
[Vol. 12
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Out of the categories of predicate offenses elucidated above,
it is clear that those with the most potential for federalizing
traditionally state causes of action, or significantly expanding
federal jurisdiction, are mail fraud, wire fraud, fraud in the sale
of securities, and bankruptcy fraud. 63 Courts have historically
been reluctant to create a private right of action under the mail
and wire fraud statutes. 64 RICO obviates this reluctance and
provides plaintiffs with a cause of action if only two acts of wire
or mail fraud are shown, thereby establishing a pattern.
65
As a result, RICO makes federal courts available to several
RICO should be the same as the tort of civil conspiracy. Its elements are: "(1) an
agreement between or among the defendants to do an unlawful thing or to do a
lawful thing in an unlawful manner and (2) an overt act that results in damages to the
plaintiff." Nathan, supra note 1, at 15; see Mizokami Bros., Inc. v. Mobay Chemical
Corp., 660 F.2d 712, 718 n.8 (8th Cir. 1981); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107,
1110 (5th Cir. 1980); Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 622 F.2d 629, 639 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1013 (1980).
63. The mail fraud statute is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and the wire fraud statute
is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The securities fraud statute is found at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(fl) and the bankruptcy fraud statute is found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 107, 403(c).
RICO's unanticipated potential to federalize common law fraud arises
from the statute's inclusion of federal mail and wire fraud as possible predi-
cate offenses. To establish a criminal violation of the mail and wire fraud
statutes, only a scheme to defraud and the use of mails or wires for the
purpose of executing the scheme need be proved. Courts uniformly have
refused, however, to create a private cause of action under these statutes.
Thus, the defrauded plaintiff has been relegated to a common law action in
state court. However, because RICO requires only two acts of mail or wire
fraud to establish a violation, and because each .mailing or wire use in fur-
therance of a fraudulent scheme, whether or not pursuant to the same
scheme, constitutes a separate offense, a private right of action for treble
damages is available for violation of section 1962 in virtually every case of
commercial mail and wire fraud. Section 1962(c) prohibits an employee or
associate of an enterprise from "conduct[ing] . . . such enterprise's affairs
through" any two acts of mail or wire fraud. Similarly, section 1962(b)
makes it unlawful to fraudulently "acquire ... any interest in or control of
any enterprise" through any two such acts. Given the prevalence of mail
and wire use in commercial transactions, RICO's provisions for a private
cause of action predicated on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes
virtually federalizes common law fraud.
See Note, supra note 2, at 1104-05 (citations omitted).
The United States Supreme Court in Sedimoa took judicial notice of an ABA task
force report that found "of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level,
40% involved securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a commercial or business
setting, and only 9% 'allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated
with professional criminals.'" Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287 (citing Report, Ad Hoc Civil
RICO Task Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING & BusINESs LAw 55-56).
64. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1979);
Bell v. Health-Mor, Inc., 549 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1977). For discussion of the use
of mail and wire fraud in RICO cases, see Liman, supra note 35, at 16-20; Nathan,
supra note 1, at 16-20.
65. The Act requires "at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a 10 year
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new classes of fraud victims who were traditionally relegated to
state court and state law formulations for damages, which are
generally out-of-pocket losses. 66 The statute also provides
fraud victims with an enhanced reason to choose to prosecute
an action in federal court because of its treble damage
provision.
7
D. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
The definition of racketeering activity was analyzed in the
previous section. This portion of the Article focuses on the
"pattern" necessary to be established in a RICO action. A
"pattern of racketeering activity" is defined in section 1961(5)
as "at least two acts of racketeering, one of which occurred af-
ter the effective date of this chapter and the last of which oc-
curred within ten years . . . after the commission of a prior
act of racketeering activity." 68
The effective date of the RICO legislation was October 15,
1970, so that any two racketeering acts occurring within a ten-
year period after 1970 is cognizable as a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity under federal law.69 In most cases, if the isolated
act of fraud is truly an integral part of any fraudulent scheme,
it will have occurred within a relatively short time frame and
certainly shorter than ten years. Such a pattern is usually not
difficult to establish under this standard.
While RICO ostensibly erects the "pattern" barrier to weed
out civil litigants, a pattern is quite easy to construct in three
basic scenarios. First, a pattern develops when one act is in-
dictable, chargeable, or punishable under both state and fed-
eral law. It is conceivable that a single criminal act
prosecutable under state and federal law provides a civil liti-
gant with the two necessary predicate acts for a RICO action.
For example, if a RICO defendant violated state gambling laws
period. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5). Mail and wire fraud are two predicate acts of racketeer-
ing activity.
66. See, e.g., Strouth v. Wilkinson, 302 Minn. 297, 300, 224 N.W.2d 511, 514
(1974).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
68. Id. § 1961(5).
69. The date of passage of RICO was October 15, 1970. See Pub. L. No. 91-452,
Title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 94iasamendedbv Pub. L. No. 95-575 § 3(c)
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punishable by a year's imprisonment, a racketeering act would
have also been committed. Furthermore, by committing the
state gambling offense, the defendant would also have violated
18 U.S.C. § 1955, a federal act prohibiting certain operations
which violate the state gambling laws. This act is also denomi-
nated as a racketeering activity in section 1961 (1) (B) of RICO.
It follows, that two predicate acts were committed for RICO's
definitional purposes. This single violation could result in a
pattern of racketeering activity and RICO liability.
711
The second scenario in which a RICO action is easily con-
structed is when a single criminal episode constitutes a pattern
of racketeering activity. 7' For instance, in United States v. Moel-
ler,72 the defendant was criminally charged with burning a fac-
tory and kidnapping three employees. These acts were all
committed within the course of one afternoon. The question
arose whether these acts strung together in a short time frame
could be interpreted as a pattern of racketeering activity. The
court held that they could, and did not dismiss the RICO
indictment. 73
The final scenario in which RICO elements are satisfied is
when there are two acts of mail or wire fraud pursuant to a
single fraudulent scheme. Under federal criminal law, each
mailing or wire communication translates into a separate viola-
tion of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.74 If two mail-
ings or wire communications occurred in furtherance of the
70. See Liman, supra note 35, at 11. As pointed out by Mr. Liman, the two of-
fenses may be considered separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes. Id.; see also
Moran, supra note 4, at 779-82.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
72. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (relying on United States v. Parness, 503
F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974)).
73. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 57-58; see United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040
(6th Cir. 1984) (conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to murder may consti-
tute separate predicate acts for a RICO conviction); see also Beth Israel Medical
Center v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (mail and wire fraud where
confidential information was sold to attorney for use in soliciting client); United
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (six incidents of wire fraud in
defrauding the victim over a few weeks period); United States v. Salvitti, 451 F. Supp.
195, 200 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (each mailing, although it may be related to a single scheme,
is a separate act for purposes of meeting the "pattern" requirement), affd, 588 F.2d
822 (3d Cir. 1977).
74. See United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978); Hulse
v. Hale Farms Dev. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D. Conn. 1984) (two or more
mailings incident to a scheme to defraud in violation of the mail fraud statute suffi-
cient to allege a substantive RICO violation).
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scheme within a ten year period, a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity is created. 75 While the above scenario suggests the ap-
parent latitude in which courts have interpreted RICO in
finding a pattern of racketeering, some courts have even held
that the two predicate acts need not be related to each other.76
This single interpretation defeats whatever definitional limita-
tion Congress chose to impose by inserting the requirement
that a pattern be established.
A few courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have addressed the issue of whether the requirement of dem-
onstrating a "pattern" is becoming a superfluous or nonexis-
tent requirement in light of recent decisions. 77 In an apparent
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
76. See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir. 1978); see also
United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); Moran, supra
note 4, at 783. The above cases should be compared with the holding in United
States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the court held there
must be a relationship among each of the predicate acts of racketeering. Id. at 613-
14. With respect to both the Elliott and Stofsky decisions, Mr. Moran has commented:
Though neither rule is specifically required by the statute, the Elliott ap-
proach is fundamentally sound and should be followed. Because it is the
operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that
Section 1962(c) prohibits, the Elliott requirement that a plaintiff show that
the predicate acts are related to the affairs of the enterprise is firmly based
on a plain reading of the statute. If, as previously suggested, the enterprise
is alleged as the association in fact of the person or persons who engaged in
the predicate acts, the Elliott standard should not be difficult to meet. More-
over, adherence to Stofsky in certain cases is likely to provoke judicial hostil-
ity because Stofsky would permit plaintiffs to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity on the basis of predicate acts that have nothing to do
with the enterprise. For example, in a typical business or commercial fraud
action, a plaintiff could, under Stofsky, establish the necessary pattern by al-
leging predicate acts that are totally unrelated to the fraudulent conduct that
is the basis for the plaintiffs action. Such a result would encourage misuse
of RICO, and should be rejected in favor of the Elliott rule.
Moran, supra note 4, at 783.
77. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. In Sedima, the United States Supreme
Court intimated that two underlying predicate acts may not be sufficient to establish a
pattern. This underscores the importance of establishing not simply a "technical"
pattern but also a "practical" pattern. See also Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. City of
Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (multiple bribes at a single fund-raising
event not sufficient for a pattern); Moeller, 402 F. Supp. at 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975)
(court held the common sense interpretation required finding pattern from different
criminal episodes); Anthony, Exploring RICO: Civil Remedies for Violation of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, HENNEPIN LAw. July-Aug. 1983, at 35-36.
Moran has provided some pragmatic insight to why a pattern should consist not
only of two underlying predicate acts, but rather, an actual pattern.
To convince a skeptical district judge, the practitioner should consider
whether the defendant's conduct can be characterized, not only legally but
also practically, as constituting a pattern of racketeering activity. These
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attempt to revitalize the pattern requirement, some courts
have held that it may take more than two underlying predicate
acts to make a pattern. This interpretation is drawn from the
language of section 1961(5) which states that a pattern re-
quires "two or more acts of racketeering." These courts have
not felt constrained by previous decisions and have capitalized
on the "or more" language to suggest that only two acts of
mail fraud for example, may not suffice to make a pattern.
This type of analysis implicitly denounces reasoning like that in
Elliott, that the two predicate acts need not be related. 78 As a
result, this rationale actually resurrects the requirement that a
RICO plaintiff establish a nexus between each of the racketeer-
ing acts. 79 This interpretation should be applauded since it
may present the only legitimate barrier to spurious fraud ac-
tions which are not intended to be true subjects of RICO
actions.
Other courts are simply insisting that the racketeering acts
must be connected with each other by some common scheme,
plan, or motive that constitutes a pattern and not simply a se-
ries of disconnected acts.80 This requires that a federal court
practical or extra-legislative factors that lend credence to the existence of a
pattern or scheme include the relationship among the predicate acts, the
relationship of the predicate acts to the enterprise, and the nature and fre-
quency of the predicate acts.
To minimize the likelihood ofjudicial resistance, the practitioner should not
consider a RICO action unless the two predicate offenses arise from distinct
and separate acts that are themselves related to the operation of the enter-
prise. These acts should be separate in time and place not only from each
other, but also from any underlying contract or agreement. In this way,
there will be no "bootstrapping" of predicate offenses whereby a pattern is
alleged on the basis of a single act or occurrence.
Moran, supra note 4, at 781-82, 786 (citations omitted).
78. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899 n.23.
79. See Moran, supra note 4, at 782-83.
80. In Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14, the Court stated:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it
states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (emphasis added) not that it "means" two such acts. The
implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.
Indeed, in common parlance, two of anything do not generally form a "pat-
tern." The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of
racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report ex-
plained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltra-
tion of legitimate business normally requires more than 'racketeering
activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor
of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." S. Rep.
No. 91-617, p. 158 (1969) (emphasis added). Similarly, the sponsor of the
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must be convinced that the independent racketeering acts are
not disjointed from each other, but are interrelated and
designed to promote the enterprise. 8 Courts will probably re-
quire a litigant to show more than a "technical" pattern; a
"practical" pattern will have to be proved.8 2
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in a foot-
note in Sedima.S3 The Court stated, "in common parlance two
of anything do not generally form a 'pattern'" and "two iso-
lated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pat-
tern."8 4 The Court clarified the issue that two independent
Senate bill, after quoting this portion of the Report, pointed out to his col-
leagues that "[t]he term 'patterns' itself requires the showing of a relation-
ship. . . .So, therefore, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without
more, does not establish a pattern .... " Id.
81. See Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1975) (must be a relationship among each of the predicate acts of racketeering). In-
terrelated acts designed to promote the enterprise are likely to be considered part of
a pattern. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1980); Elliott, 571 F.2d at
889 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1977).
82. See Moran, supra note 4, at 787-88 where he states:
Consideration of the nature and frequency of the predicate acts, and
the relationship to the enterprise, will allow the practitioner to go beyond a
mere determination that the legal elements of a RICO action have techni-
cally been met, and will enable him or her to analyze the propriety of a
RICO claim in terms of its practical impact on a district judge. Having as-
certained that the minimum statutory requirements for a RICO claim can be
alleged, the practitioner can then assess whether such a bare-bones asser-
tion, given the entire factual context of the case, is likely to withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss. If it will not, the factors discussed above may be used to
buttress the minimal assertion of the RICO claim.
If the RICO action cannot be strengthened in this matter, the practi-
tioner must take a closer look at the RICO claim and decide whether the
benefits of asserting a minimal RICO action in a garden-variety commercial
fraud case are commensurate with the risks. The former include the signifi-
cant bargaining leverage that comes with the prospect of treble damages in
attorneys' fees, while the latter include stiffening opposition, loss of credibil-
ity with the district judge, dismissal, and sanctions. Only if there are no
other grounds upon which recovery may be predicated, does the assertion
of a skeletal RICO action appear to justify its risks. Thus, by focusing on the
entire factual context from which a RICO claim must be drawn, the practi-
tioner will be able to temper any immediate inclination to assert a RICO
action whenever the letter of the statute can be satisfied.
RICO is a powerful remedy that cannot be ignored in business and
commercial litigation. Yet, the practitioner must be mindful ofjudicial hos-
tility to the use of RICO in such cases, and carefully tailor their complaint to
minimize the likelihood that this hostility will manifest itself in a dismissal of
the action. This can be done by undertaking a principled analysis of the
facts to determine the existence of an enterprise through which statutorily
defined "persons" conducted or participated in a statutorily defined "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity.
Id.
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and unrelated acts of racketeering activity may not be sufficient
to constitute a pattern.
II. PLEADING A RICO CASE
A. Encountering Judicial and Defense Hostility
From the outset, the practitioner must bear in mind that
RICO allegations are met with hostility from both defendants
and judges.85 The implication that another person or entity is
a "racketeer," together with the possibility of being held liable
for treble damages, is undoubtedly the origin of this hostility.
A RICO complaint must be carefully crafted and well-tailored
to the facts of each case. Sloppy and ill-conceived pleading will
subject the plaintiff to swift retribution in the form of a motion
to dismiss from defense counsel. Plaintiffs should expect that
motions to dismiss will be made expeditiously and vigorously,
since defendants generally consider being labeled a racketeer
repugnant to their integrity and seriously damaging to their
reputation.
Pleading a RICO case should not be treated as a perfunctory
exercise adopted from a form book.8 6 RICO allegations are
serious in tenor and subject defendants to an extremely broad
scope of discovery. Accordingly, many courts have utilized
Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring fraud
to be pled with particularity, to bludgeon RICO cases to death
at an infantile stage. 87
RICO cases engender hostility because they expand federal
court jurisdiction and complicate commercial litigation. RICO
85. See Anthony, Is RICO In Your Future?, HENNEPIN LAw. Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 25-
26. See generally Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Every-
body's Darling, " 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982).
86. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 326-27 & n.193; Moran, supra note 4, at 768 n.205.
The Fourth Circuit in Computer Sciences, makes an excellent point that should be
thoughtfully considered by potential RICO plaintiffs:
Resourceful lawyers representing criminal defendants often desire to be
thorough and to overlook nothing in their commendable zeal to afford first-
class representation. Consequently, in many cases they tend to excess as
they inundate us with a plethora of arguments, some good and some not so
good. Sometimes one wonders whether such lack of selectivity is not
counterproductive, for a party raising a point of little merit exposes himself
to the risk of excessive discount for a better point because of the company it
keeps.
Computer Sciences, 689 F.2d at 1183; United States v. Hart, 693 F.2d 286, 287 n.l (3d
Cir. 1982).
87. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1062.
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also breeds work for the federal courts and compounds the ju-
dicial supervision of discovery. RICO cases are received and
defended with much acrimony and tenacity. Motions to stay
the proceedings,8 8 the assertion of the fifth amendment privi-
lege, protective orders, nondestruct orders, Rule 6(e) motions
to release grand jury records, Rule 37 motions to impose sanc-
tions, and dispositive motions are all endemic to RICO litiga-
tion. This potential paucity of additional motion work in a
RICO case nudges even reluctant judges into seriously consid-
ering motions to dismiss.
Many courts have been receptive to motions to dismiss com-
plaints under Rule 9 for technically insufficient complaints. A
paradigm case is Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. 89 In Moss, the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because it lacked a
factual basis for establishing the defendant's nexus to organ-
ized crime and other definitional RICO elements. 90 The trial
court also dismissed the plaintiff's RICO claim in Mauriber v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,91 since the plaintiff failed to
plead fraud with the requisite particularity.
92
Motions to dismiss were also granted in Rae v. Union Bank,
93
and Harper v. New Japan Securities International, Inc.94 In both
88. One court curiously upheld RICO allegations in the context of a corporate
takeover, but stayed RICO discovery:
Even though the RICO count survives the motion to dismiss, the very
breadth and vagueness of the RICO statute suggests that the courts assume
some control of such counts in civil actions. It is not too difficult to allege
sufficient facts to add a RICO count to many kinds of civil cases, thus greatly
expanding the scope of litigation. Among other things, a defendant may be
exposed to pretrial discovery of every aspect of its business for a ten-year
period. I doubt that this was the result contemplated or intended by Con-
gress when the civil provisions were added to RICO.
It seems to me that prudent and economical case management requires
that courts insist that the plaintiff show that the defendant has caused it le-
gally compensable injury before it be allowed to expand the case to secure
the triple damages and attorneys' fees that RICO provides.
Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,217 (D. Mass. 1981).
89. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
90. Moss, 553 F. Supp. at 1361-62.
91. Mauiber, 546 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The trial court dismissed for
failure to allege the underlying fraud with particularity. Id. at 397.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint which adequately stated the allegation
of fraud and the RICO claim. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F.
Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
92. Alauriber, 546 F. Supp. at 397.
93. 725 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1984).
94. 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see also Landmark Sav. & Loan v.
[Vol. 12
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cases, the plaintiffs had inadequately pleaded substantive viola-
tions of the statute. In Rae, the plaintiffs did not even attempt
to amend the complaint. In Harper, the plaintiff was granted
leave to amend the complaint and the defendants again moved
to dismiss after the amended complaint was filed. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss since the plaintiffs had
once again failed to allege any racketeering-type injury.
95
It is a testimony to this judicial hostility that the develop-
ment of civil RICO law has occurred primarily at the pretrial
stage through the motion work of parties. Practitioners plead-
ing RICO cases should not complacently rely on the liberal
pleading policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to sal-
vage a deficient complaint since many of the previously dis-
cussed factors militate in favor of dismissing improperly
pleaded complaints. In fact, it might be stated that the devel-
oping body of RICO cases has created a judicial inertia sup-
porting dismissals.
B. Elements of a RICO Action
1. Person Distinct from Enterprise
The initial hurdle to overcome in pleading is to identify both
the "person" and the "enterprise" as identities distinct from
each other. This is imperative since a complaint may be dis-
missed for failure to plead the requisite separateness of the
two.9 6 A person is one who conducts the affairs of the enter-
Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (plaintiff failed to allege a "racke-
teering enterprise injury").
95. Harper, 545 F. Supp. at 1008. But see United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387
(2d Cir. 1979) (setting forth elements of "pattern of racketeering activity"), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
96. See Anthony, supra note 77, at 35; Blakey, supra note 2, at 286-325 (examina-
tion of the substantive requirements of pleading that the "person" is distinct from
the "enterprise"); see also Rae, 725 F.2d at 480-81 (if bank is the enterprise, it cannot
also be the RICO defendant); Computer Science Corp., 689 F.2d at 1190 (enterprise
meant to refer to something different from person whose behavior the act was
designed to prohibit or punish); Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1061-62 (plaintiff failed to state
claim where complaint placed corporation in role of "person" responsible for con-
ducting affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, but did not
clearly allege that community was "enterprise" acted upon by such person); United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988-89 (11th Cir. 1982) (in criminal RICO violation
corporation may simultaneously be both defendant and enterprise), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1170 (1983); Action Indus. Tender Offer, 578 F. Supp. at 849 (possible to allege that
action is the enterprise and that the inside and outside directors are the persons
associated with the enterprise in conducting racketeering activity); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v.
Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339, 346-47 (D.NJ. 1983); United States v. Ben-
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prise through a pattern of racketeering activity. A person can
be any entity capable of acquiring or holding a beneficial inter-
est in property such as a labor union, corporation, or partner-
ship. Nevertheless, a person must still have an existence
distinct from the enterprise for purposes of RICO.9 
7
This issue was encountered by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Bennett v. Berg.98 Bennett involved an alleged scheme
in which John Knox Village, a corporate, nonprofit retirement
community; Kenneth Berg, the founder of the Village; Pruden-
tial Insurance Company, the mortgage lender; and the Vil-
lage's accountants, lawyers, officers, and directors were named
defendants. For an "entrance endowment," the plaintiffs were
entitled to lifetime residency at the Village with housing, food,
laundry, and medical assistance provided. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the Village was virtually bankrupt, that services had
deteriorated, and life care was in jeopardy. The plaintiffs al-
leged fraud in promoting the retirement community. 99
The first count of the plaintiffs' complaint in Bennett sought
treble damages from all defendants, except the Village, which
was named as the enterprise operated by the other defendants.
The second count unfortunately caused some confusion by
casting the Village in the role of "person" for purposes of
seeking equitable relief.'00 The district court surmised from
the pleading that the retirement community, as an association
in fact, was the enterprise.' 0 ' Prudential argued that no enter-
prise had been alleged apart from the person who "associated
with" an enterprise for the purpose of engaging in racketeer-
ing activity. ' 0 2
The court rectified this error by allowing the dismissal of
Count II, since the Village was considered both the person and
ney, 559 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 23-24 (enter-
prise cannot simultaneously be the defendant and the person).
97. See Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1061-62; Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany, 742 F.2d
408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3551 (1985). But see Blakey, supra note 2,
at 286-325. One way to avoid this dilemma is to plead the RICO enterprise as an
association in fact which of necessity may consist of persons not distinct from the
enterprise.
98. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
99. Id. at 1057.
100. Id. at 1061.
101. Id. at 1060.
102. Id. at 1061.
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the enterprise. °0 3 The court, however, suggested that on re-
mand, the plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their com-
plaint to effectuate justice and did not reach a decision on the
pleadings. 0 4
Practitioners can avoid the mistake made in Bennett by simply
pleading the person as distinct from the enterprise through
which the person has acted. For example, if the complaint al-
leged that a corporate defendant and its officers and directors
acted in a pervasively fraudulent manner to induce the plain-
tiffs to make an investment in the corporate defendant, the al-
legations would be technically insufficient, since the culpable
"persons" were not distinct from the enterprise. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff alleged that the officers and directors op-
erated the "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity which included fraudulent representations that induced
the plaintiff to invest in the corporate defendant, there would
be an enterprise distinct from the culpable persons. 105
The anomaly encountered by not characterizing an enter-
prise as a defendant is that the plaintiff may recognize that the
enterprise is the only entity capable of satisfying a civil judg-
ment.106 Yet if the enterprise must be distinct from the offend-
ing person, the plaintiff cannot name the enterprise as the
defendant and collect a judgment from that party. It has been
suggested that enterprises occupy several different roles in
RICO actions of "prize," "instrument," "victim," or "perpe-
trator."' 107 These roles are not mutually exclusive.' 08
If the enterprise is also an unknowing victim or prize of the
perpetrator, then it would be senseless to name the victim as a
defendant since it would not serve the remedial purposes con-
templated by the statute. 09 If, however, the enterprise is con-
trolled by the perpetrators, or the perpetrators can bind the
enterprise under the doctrines of respondeat superior, then it
103. Id. at 1062.
104. Id.
105. See Anthony, supra note 77, at 35.
106. Nathan, supra note 1, at 12.
107. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 307-25.
108. Id. at 307.
109. See United States v. Melton, 689 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1982) (individual
owner of a business used his enterprise to defraud property insurance carriers
through a pattern of arson, mail fraud, and extortion); United States v. Weisman, 624
F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.) (theater violated RICO by skimming ticket sales and con-
cessions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Blakey, snpra note 2, at 323-25.
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may prove fruitful to also name the enterprise as a person. 110
If the enterprise plays the role of perpetrator, liability of the
enterprise should follow and the enterprise should be named
as a person in the complaint. Where the enterprise is a person,
courts should impose vicarious and entity civil liability under
well-established principles of federal law. I"' This imputation
of liability is also consistent with RICO's broad remedial
purposes.
As Professor Blakey stated following the Bennett 112 decision,
"A more difficult issue, however, is presented by the role of
110. Professor Blakey would impose civil liability in the case where an enterprise
is the perpetrator and has some level of culpability in the fraud or scheme alleged by
the RICO plaintiff. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 307-25. A tougher issue is reached
where the enterprise is a "prize" or "victim." Professor Blakey advises that "no
salutory remedial purpose would be served by attributing the conduct of an individ-
ual involved in the pattern of racketeering activity to the individual or entity playing
the role of the enterprise, whether for civil liability or criminal responsibility." Id. at
323. The most difficult issue, however, is when the enterprise plays the role of "in-
strument." For a discussion of the issue, see infra notes 115-20 and accompanying
text.
The court in Parnes, found that the enterprise was a "victim," and stated that in
that event:
[tihat sort of respondeat superior application, perhaps permissible to estab-
lish ordinary civil liability, would be bizarre indeed as a means to warp the
facts alleged in this case into the RICO mold. Under that theory, malefac-
tors at a low corporate level could thrust treble damage liability on a wholly
unwitting corporate management and shareholders.
Parnes, 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9. But see Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079,
1083-84 (D. Del. 1984) (usual agency principles apply in imposing RICO liability).
If the entity participates in or directly benefits from the racketeering activity, it
should be named as a defendant under vicarious liability or respondeat superior prin-
ciples. See Moran, supra note 4, at 775-76 & n.251. Where the entity has acted or
participated in or benefitted from the pattern of racketeering activities, it may be
permissible to allege it as both enterprise and defendant. See, e.g., Alcorn County v.
United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1984) (fraudu-
lent sales of office supplies); Hartle', 678 F.2d at 988 (government inspector paid by
corporation to falsify inspection reports); B.F. Hirsch Inc., 577 F. Supp. at 343 (fraud-
ulent misrepresentation and illegal retainage fee). But see, Rae, 725 F.2d at 481;
Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Kirschner v.
Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (cable television companies
could not simultaneously constitute both RICO enterprise and persons associated
with enterprise). For an extended discussion comparing the Hartle, and Computer Sc-
ences decisions, see Blakey, supra note 2, at 324 nn.181-85; see also United States v.
Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1000 (6th Cir. 1982) (discussing legislative intent in defin-
ing "enterprise"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982); Moran, supra note 4, at 777 &
n.255; Comment, RICO: The Corporation as an "En teiprise" and Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L.
REV. 503 (1983) (comparing the Computer Sciences and HartleY interpretations of
"enterprise").
11. See supra note 110.
112. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
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'instrument.' "113 When the enterprise assumes this role, it is
used in the unlawful conduct, but does not originate the
scheme as an entity as does a "perpetrator." Such an enter-
prise is not "wholly innocent, as when it plays the role of a
pure 'prize' or 'victim.' "114 Professor Blakey believes that in
the case of an "instrument" enterprise, the risk of civil liability,
but not criminal responsibility, should shift to the
enterprise. ' 15
An example of an "instrument" enterprise is drawn from the
unreported case of Holmberg v. Morrissette and Mintex Corp. 1136 In
Holmberg, the defendant Morrissette acted through the enter-
prise, Mintex Corporation, to submit false, forged and altered
documents to three seperate banks to draw down on letters of
credit. The documents submitted by Morrissette represented
that Mintex Corporation was entitled to proceeds from the let-
ters of credit since he had manufactured and shipped goods
overseas and had not been paid for them." 17
Morrissette was the principal shareholder, a director, and
president of Mintex Corporation. Morrissette acted fraudu-
lently under the auspices of Mintex to receive the proceeds to
pay for goods manufactured by Mintex Corporation. The dis-
trict court found Morrissette liable under RICO and both Mor-
rissette and Mintex liable under common law counts of fraud
and conversion of the proceeds from the letters of credit.' 18
The Holmberg case is instructive because it demonstrates the
passive role an enterprise may play and yet benefit from the
racketeering activity of a controlling person. Civil liability is
correctly transmitted to the enterprise in such a case.
From a pleading perspective, when dealing with corpora-
tions, partnerships, associations, or other legal entities, a
plaintiff should aver that the enterprise is both distinct from
the person, but derivatively liable for the acts of its employee,
officer, director, or agent under the familiar doctrines of re-
spondeat superior or vicarious liability. This allows a plaintiff
to comply with the technical requirements of RICO by separat-
ing the person from the enterprise. It also enables the plaintiff
113. Blakey, supra note 2, at 323.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 324.
116. No. 3-83-1383 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 1985).
117. Id. at 23.
118. Id. at 22-23.
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to allege the financial responsibility of the enterprise for any
judgment rendered against its employee or agent. I'
Another tactical approach used by some plaintiffs and ap-
proved by certain courts is to plead the enterprise as an associ-
ation in fact of the individual and the corporate entity. This
avoids the necessity of pleading the separateness of the indi-
vidual from the entity since the individual is an integral part of
the associated relationship. 20
2. Pleading the Enterprise Distinct from the Pattern
of Racketeering Activity
To properly plead the acts of racketeering activity, each ele-
ment of the underlying offense must be pled in the complaint
and must be proved at trial. If the individual violation consists
of two acts of mail fraud, the complaint must state with speci-
ficity, to the extent it is known or ascertainable, the time, date,
and place of the communications, including who created the
mailed document, who mailed it, who received it, and its rela-
tionship to the overall scheme. A plaintiff who can provide this
much information in a RICO complaint, should survive, or
even evade, a motion to dismiss under Rule 9 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Turkette, the Supreme Court addressed the relationship
between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.' 2' In Turkette, the Court held that the enterprise must be
an entity separate from the pattern for purposes of pleading
and proof. 22 If the complaint alleges an "association in fact"
under RICO, the association is pled and proved by events of
an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by showing
that the associates functioned in concert with each other. -'2 3
Turkette also makes it clear that the statutory language of
RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate associa-
tions. 2 4 Where the enterprise is comprised of individuals as-
sociated for illegal activity, the plaintiff must plead and prove
119. See Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1082-83; see also Dwyer & Kielv, Vicarious Liability
Under the Racketeer Influenced atnd Conupt Organizations Act, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 324, 342-
45 (1985).
120. Moran, supra note 4, at 772-74, 777-79.
121. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576.
122. Id. at 583.
123. See id. at 582-83.
124. Id. at 585.
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an entity or unit distinct from the acts of racketeering.125 As
the Bennett court stated, "Discrete existence, rather than the
legality or illegality of enterprise's activities or goals, is the
test."' 126 This may result in an overlap of proof of both the
enterprise and pattern. 1
27
Where the enterprise is a separate legal entity, such as a cor-
poration, partnership, joint venture, nonprofit association or
another organization recognized under state law, the enter-
prise is separate from the pattern of racketeering activity.' 28
This rule implies that the practitioner should clearly distin-
guish the enterprise as a legal entity separate from the pattern
of racketeering activity.' 29 The practitioner should also plead
the facts in a way that will demonstrate a relationship among
the individual acts of racketeering activity so that a pattern
emerges. It would be wise to allege that the racketeering acts
are intertwined as an integral and necessary incident to the un-
derlying scheme, and therefore constitute a pattern under the
purview of section 1961(5).
3. Pleading the Injury was Proximately Caused by the RICO Acts
At least two reported cases suggest that courts may require
the plaintiffs injury to be proximately caused by the RICO vio-
lation. 30  Courts capitalize on the language in RICO which
states that treble damages are available only to the plaintiff
who has suffered injury in his business or property "by reason
of" a violation of section 1962.'1' The Seventh Circuit case of
Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 132 seems to require that the
plaintiff's injury must be direct and proximately caused before
125. Id. at 583.
126. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060.
127. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
128. See Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060. Cf United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664
(8th Cir.) (requiring "proof of some structure separate from the racketeering activ-
ity"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89-90
(2d Cir.) (common or shared purpose among the individuals and evidence of their
functioning as a continuing unit sufficient to establish an enterprise), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 945 (1983).
129. Although both the "enterprise" and the "pattern" must be proven, separate
proof need not be presented for each. See Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 89.
130. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp.
1061, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
131. The "by reason of' language is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
132. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
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plaintiff may sue for treble damages.133
In Cenco, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the
RICO count brought by a company's independent auditors
against the company and its former officers and directors.
3 4
The auditors had been named as co-defendants in an action
brought by the purchasers of the company's securities against
the issuer, its officers and directors, and independent auditors
for negligence in auditing the company's financial state-
ments.13 5 The purchasers alleged these parties violated the se-
curities laws by inflating the company's stock prices.
3 6
The auditors settled these claims with the plaintiff and then
sought to sue the company for three times the settlement
under RICO. The auditors argued that if the company had not
engaged in securities fraud, which misled them in conducting
their audit, they would not have had to pay a settlement to the
stock purchasers. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, under these circumstances, the auditors lacked standing
to maintain a civil RICO action.
37
The Cenco holding suggests that the auditors were indirect
victims of the predicate acts of securities fraud, which consti-
tuted the RICO violation. The direct victims were the purchas-
ers of the company's stock. The auditors, as indirect victims,
were not entitled to relief because their injuries were not prox-
imately caused by the RICO violation. This decision seems ap-
133. See id. The Seventh Circuit in Haroco stated, "A defendant who violates Sec-
tion 1962 is not liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured by other
conduct, nor is the defendant liable to those who had not been injured." Haroco, 747
F.2d at 398. The United States Supreme Court in Sedima also added "in addition,
plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been
injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting a violation." Sedima,
105 S. Ct. at 3285-86.
134. Cenco, 686 F.2d at 457.
135. Id. at 451.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 457. The Cenco court stated:
It is presumably on behalf of the owners, perhaps also the customers and
competitors, of such businesses that the civil damage remedy was created,
and not on behalf of the people who supply office equipment or financial or
legal services to criminal enterprises that may be violating RICO. It is un-
likely that Congress if it had adverted to the issue would have chosen to
create in the wake of every RICO violation waves of treble-damage suits by
all who may have suffered indirectly from the violation, especially when
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propriate to preclude an inundation of claims by those
remotely injured by the alleged RICO violator.
4. Requesting the Appropriate Relief
Section 1964(a) of the statute expressly provides equitable
relief and empowers federal courts to restrain violations of sec-
tion 1962 by issuing appropriate orders. Some confusion has
arisen whether private litigants are authorized to utilize section
1964(a), since section 1964(b) authorizes the attorney general
to bring civil suits.' 38 It is uncertain whether section 1964(a)
was to be limited to use by the federal government or whether
it is only a general grant of equitable power to federal courts in
both government and private suits. 1 3
9
138. The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to prevent and re-
strain violations of section 1962 by issuing appropriate order. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) reads:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate or-
ders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable re-
strictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including,
but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of
endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect inter-
state or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Id. Section 1964(b) provides:
The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any
action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall pro-
ceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pend-
ing final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the
acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
Id. § 1964(b).
One court has stated that § 1964(a) gives courts power to issue injunctions and
other equitable relief in RICO civil actions brought by plaintiffs. See USACO Coal, 689
F.2d at 95 n.l.
The following cases have not allowed a court to grant injunctive or other equita-
ble relief to a private plaintiff in a civil RICO action. See, e.g., Dan River, 701 F.2d at
290 (injunctive and other equitable relief probably not authorized in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 84-85
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
Professor Blakey believes that equitable relief to private parties is authorized by
§ 1964(a). Professor Blakey writes:
It is difficult to see how a court could conclude that RICO does not provide
equitable relief for private parties. Section 1964(a) is a general grant of eq-
uitable power. It is not limited on its face or in its legislative history. Sec-
tion 1964(b) grants the government authority to seek relief, an authority
that it was necessary to set out lest old learning be used to circumscribe the
new governmental power to seek equitable relief. Nothing in Section
1964(b) speaks in negative terms about an authorization for private parties
to seek similar relief. Indeed, the governmental suits are to be brought on
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The provisional relief offered by RICO enables federal
courts to utilize a broad array of equitable tools historically
employed by courts to safeguard the interests of an aggrieved
plaintiff. Among these equitable tools used by federal courts
are temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
divestitures, voluntary dissolutions, receiverships, reorganiza-
tions, attachments, protective trusts, or equitable liens to pre-
vent defendants from secreting or dissipating assets during the
pendency of litigation.
It is well settled that in all cases in federal court, state law is
incorporated to determine the availability of prejudgment rem-
edies for seizure of personal property.' 40 Rule 64 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "all remedies
providing for the seizure of personal property for the purpose
of securing satisfaction of the judgement . . . are available
under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the
law of the state in which the district court is held."'1
4'
Since RICO relies on the law of the forum state to determine
if equitable remedies are available to a plaintiff, certain equita-
ble remedies could be available in one state under a lenient
standard and unavailable in another state under a more strin-
gent standard. This could produce forum shopping under
RICO's jurisdiction, venue, and process serving provisions.
42
The end result could be "a wholly unjustifiable lack of uni-
formity in the practical impact of a major federal statute on
behalf of private parties. No satisfactory explanation can be offered as to
why Congress would have precluded victims from seeking help themselves.
Section 1964(c), moreover, says "sue and" and not "sue to." The contrary
argument would have to suggest that by adding the right to secure treble
damage relief to the general right to sue Congress somehow manifested an
intention to subtract the right to obtain other forms of relief. How addition
might be converted into subtraction in a remedial statute that must be liber-
ally construed strains even the legal imagination. Section 1964 ought to be
read as authorizing both governmental and private suits to obtain equitable
relief. To the degree that any ambiguity might be thought to exist in the
choice of language, the liberal construction clause and the remedial purpose
of the statute come down on the side of finding private suits to be author-
ized and that full relief can be granted. No satisfactory rationale can be
offered, in short, to explain why a court ought to feel itself circumscribed in
doing full justice for a victim under RICO.
Blakey, supra note 2, at 331-32 (footnotes omitted).
140. See Nathan, supra note 1, at 52; Blakey, supra note 2, at 334-40 & n.217; see also
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Local 170 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 436-37
n.10 (1974).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
142. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 331-41.
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both plaintiffs and defendants." 1 4 3 Congress should solve this
problem by amending RICO to provide express equitable rem-
edies with the definable standards for their use under RICO. 144
Equitable relief was granted a private litigant in USACO Coal
Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 145 upon a complaint by the plaintiff
that the defendants had defrauded it of approximately
$8,300,000 in connection with certain coal leases. The plaintiff
sought treble damages under RICO and also alleged a breach
of fiduciary duty, fraud, and breach of contract. The plaintiff
sought and secured a preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants from dissipating specific assets pendente lite. The
defendants appealed the order. 146
The defendants argued that the district court had no author-
ity to sequester their assets under section 1964(a) to secure a
potential treble damage judgment under section 1964(c). The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' argu-
ments that the district court had improperly issued the injunc-
tion. The district court issued the injunction under its general
equitable power stemming from its pendent jurisdiction under
common law claims, rather than to secure the RICO damage
award. 1
47
One of the most interesting aspects of USACO is that the de-
cision discussed the availability of injunctive relief under tradi-
tional principles for granting injunctive relief under Rule 65 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court in USACO
found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a "substantial likeli-
hood" of success on the merits and had a "high probability"
that the defendants would transfer assets out of the country if
not enjoined. 1
48
143. Id. at 341.
144. Id.
145. 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
146. Id. at 96. The appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982).
147. 689 F.2d at 96-97.
148. Id. It is also interesting to note that the district court was held to have prop-
erly dismissed the bond normally required under Rule 65(c) since the injunction did
not interfere with the defendant's daily business activities. Id. at 100. This case
should be contrasted with Ashland Oil, 540 F. Supp. at 81, in which the district court
rejected the plaintiffs' request for a similar injunction, where the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant stole 375,000 gallons of gasoline through a scheme to defraud
under RICO. Unfortunately, in Ashland Oil, the court treated the defendant's request
as one for an attachment. The court thought that it was a harsh remedy that ought
not to be read into § 1964 in cases brought by private parties. Id. at 85-86. The
court found that the plaintiff had established a probability of success on the merits.
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One can glean from USACO that a private plaintiff will have
to establish two factors under Rule 65 to be entitled to injunc-
tive relief. A plaintiff will have to establish a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits at trial, and a high probability
that the assets in which the moving party seeks to have pro-
tected by the injunctive relief will be endangered, secreted,
concealed, or dissipated. It is also likely the courts will require
a third factor to be established in conjunction with the second
factor articulated above. Plaintiffs may have to show that there
is a high probability that the assets will be needed to satisfy any
resulting damage award.' 49 These standards parallel conven-
tional injunctive standards but are tailored to meet the peculiar
substantive requirements of RICO.15
0
III. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Statutes of Limitations
As in initiating any litigation, the practitioner must first be
concerned with the statute of limitations in a RICO action.
Unfortunately, that question is not readily answerable under
existing federal decisions. RICO itself has no statute of limita-
tions for civil actions. Federal courts, therefore, turn to the
most analagous state law.' 51 Federal courts choose between
several categories of limitations periods to determine the most
Id. at 82; see also M1arshall Field & Co., 537 F. Supp. 420 (injunction not sufficient under
RICO because showing of likelihood of success, balance of equities and irreparable
harm were insufficient).
149. See Nathan, supra note 1, at 54. Cf United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612,
617 (9th Cir. 1982), in which these requirements were used in a criminal context.
150. Nathan, supra note 1, at 54; see FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
151. See Alexander v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 1984);
Burns v. Ersek, 591 F. Supp. 837, 843 (D. Minn. 1984); Creamer v. General Team-
sters Local Union 326, 579 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (D. Del. 1984); Estee Lauder, Inc. v.
Harco Graphics, No. 82 Civ. 8188 (CBM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1984); Kirschner, 576 F.
Supp. at 238; Seawell v. Miller Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1983);
D'Iorio v. Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 231 (M.D. Pa. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 683-84 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Ingram Corp. v.J.
Ray McDermott & Co., 495 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 & n.4 (E.D. La. 1980), rev'don other
grounds, 698 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478, 483-84 (1980); Nathan, supra note 1, at 46-48.
The conditions under which an injunction will be issued pursuant to Sec-
tion 1964 determinable from the principles that govern the granting of equi-
table relief. . .whether equitable relief is appropriate depends, as it does in
other cases in equity, on whether a preponderance of the evidence underly-
ing shows a likelihood that the defendants will commit wrongful acts in the
future . . ..
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appropriate. For those states that have adopted a RICO-type
statute with a limitations period, the decision is simplistic. In
the absence of a state RICO statute to adopt, courts must
choose between state statutes prescribing periods for actions
based on: (1) federal statutes; (2) penalty or forfeiture statutes;
or (3) fraud.
152
Since RICO is most often referred to as a remedial stat-
ute,' 53 penalty or forfeiture statutes are generally considered
inapplicable. In civil RICO cases, the statute of limitations for
fraud is most commonly applied. 154 A court could consider the
character of the underlying predicate acts pled in a RICO ac-
tion to determine if the appropriate statute of limitation relates
to those acts. If murder, kidnapping, extortion, or conspiracy
were pled, a court could look to an analogous limitations pe-
riod to adopt in a RICO case. This type of decision could lead
to a tremendous lack of uniformity in the applicable limitations
period in RICO cases and could promote forum shopping.
55
The practitioner must also consider that a court examining
the proper statute of limitations period will first determine
whether the forum state's choice of law provisions dictate that
another state's law applies. If so, the applicable statute of limi-
tations period would not be that of the forum state.' 56 The
period of the statute of limitations would appear to be applied
to the last predicate act which occurred. 57 A RICO plaintiff
could then go back ten years to find another predicate act that
could be alleged as part of the pattern. The issue of which
statute of limitations period applies is a difficult and unsettled
one which will undoubtedly present the litigator with some
problems.
B. Venue
Venue in RICO actions is set forth in section 1965(a) which
provides that an action will lie in any district in which the de-
fendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his af-
152. See Nathan, supra note 1, at 47.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1047 (1980) (federal statute
of limitations should be applied).
156. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 540 F. Supp. at 683.
157. See id. at 685.
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fairs."' 158  RICO's venue provision is more liberal than the
general federal venue statute which states the appropriate
venue in a civil action is any place where all defendants reside
or in which the claim arose. 159
Interpretations of RICO venue provisions are often bor-
rowed from the antitrust laws since the venue provision was
adopted from the antitrust venue rules. 60 An action may be
brought in any district where the claim arose as to some de-
fendants if there is no other district where there is venue over
the defendants.' 61 This allows a plaintiff to exercise venue
over distant RICO defendants, even if venue as to them was
not originally appropriate.
RICO also provides for nationwide service of process which
greatly enhances and facilitates the prosecution of a civil ac-
tion. Service of a summons and complaint is permitted if the
standard provided in section 1965(b) is met. Nationwide ser-
vice of process is allowed where it is shown that the ends of
justice require that other parties residing in any other district
be brought before the court. 162 The service of subpoenas to
compel the attendance of witnesses is also allowed nationwide
upon a showing of good cause. 163
C. Burden of Proof
A major unanswered question in civil RICO litigation is the
proper standard of proof to impose on a party prosecuting a
RICO claim.'1 4 Three potential standards apply to RICO
cases. The first is the typical preponderance of the evidence
standard used in most civil litigation. Many federal district
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). See also Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
160. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Pearson, Ball & Dowd, No. 82-Civ. 592 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 20, 1982); see also King v. Vesco, 342 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
161. See Schering v. Tech America, Dkt. No. 83-C-1820 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 1984);
Farmers Bank, 452 F. Supp. at 1280; King, 342 F. Supp. at 122; see also Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corp. v. Executive Sec. Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,164 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Bua see Eacho v. N.D. Resources, Inc., [1983-
84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,690 (D.D.C. 1984) (the interests of
justice do not require the RICO claim to be transferred to a court with proper venue
over it).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b).
163. Id. § 1965(c).
164. See Matz, Determining the Standard of Proof in Lawsuits Brought Uder RICO, Nat'l
LJ. Oct. 10, 1983, at 21, col. 1.
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courts have also advocated this standard." 5
The second standard is the clear and convincing standard,
which is applied in many state fraud cases.' 6 6 A few commen-
tators suggest that this is the proper burden of proof in RICO
actions since pleading is a serious matter compelling a height-
ened standard of proof which could also serve to prevent
spurious claims. 167
The third standard that is arguably applicable is the criminal
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard which is certainly appli-
cable in criminal RICO actions. There has been much debate
and concern that a lower burden of proof in civil cases could
jeopardize a defendant's rights if that defendant was later sub-
jected to criminal prosecution. The civil plaintiff would obvi-
ously have access to more sensitive discoverable information to
which the fifth amendment privilege may apply." 8
The United States Supreme Court in Sedima recently inti-
mated that it was not convinced that the reasonable doubt
standard applied to civil RICO cases. 169 The Sedima court was
responding to an argument by the Second Circuit that a nar-
165. See, e.g., Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 540 F. Supp. at 677; Panes, 487 F. Supp. at 647.
Some courts have expressly held that the preponderance of the evidence standard
applies as opposed to simply the appropriate civil burden of proof endorsed by those
courts listed above. See Eaby, 561 F. Supp. at 133-34; Heinold Commodities, Inc. v.
McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank, 452 F. Supp. at 1280.
166. E.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,423-24 (1979). For example, in Min-
nesota, the standard in fraud cases is the clear and convincing standard. E.g., Weise
v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 286 Minn. 199, 203, 175 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1970).
167. See Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 85, at 715-18.
168. For a discussion of the fifth amendment and discovery in RICO actions, see
Flynn, Civil RICO: A Primer on the Emerging Use and Abuse of an Elastic Treble Damage
Remedy, RICO THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION Tab F-
5, at 6-11 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1983); Pollack, Civil RICO. A Primer on the Emerging Use and
Abuse of an Elastic Treble Damage Remedy, RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUsINESS &
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION Tab F-6, at 2-28 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1983).
169. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282. The Court specifically stated:
We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established be-
yond a reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(c). In a number of
settings, conduct that can be punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a preponderance stan-
dard. There is no indication that Congress sought to depart from this gen-
eral principle here. That the offending conduct is described by reference to
criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established with
criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding of liability in a pri-
vate civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal conviction.
But we need not decide the standard of proof issue today.
If there is a problem with thus stigmatizing a garden variety defrauder by
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row construction of the statute was essential to "avoid intolera-
ble consequences."'' 71 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the Second Circuit believed that without a prior criminal con-
viction to rely on, the plaintiff would have to prove commission
of the predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7' The Sec-
ond Circuit further believed that this would require instructing
the jury as to different standards of proof for different aspects
of the case. The Second Circuit concluded that this incongru-
ous result could only be avoided if the criminality of the de-
fendant had already been established before a civil RICO
action could be maintained.
72
The Supreme Court's response to the Second Circuit in
Sedima seems to foreclose the use of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, but gives no clue whether the more stringent clear and
convincing standard might be applied. The Court has, in the
context of a securities fraud damage action, rejected the clear
and convincing standard or anything elevated above the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. 73 This is true, the
Court stated, even though the civil action is based upon fraud
which is prosecutable as a criminal offense.
174
IV. DISCOVERY TATIcs
A. The Expansive Scope of Discovery Under Rule 26
The scope of discovery in civil RICO cases can seem fright-
eningly broad to defendants. Rule 26(b)(1) provides that the
"[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not priv-
ileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
means of a civil action, it is not reduced by making certain that the defend-
ant is guilty of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 3282-83 (emphasis in original). See also Kaplan, Damages, Ijunctive Relief, Burden
of Proof and State Court RICO, CIVIL LITIGATION AFTER SEDIMA 215, 227-28 (RICO
Law Rptr. 1985) (courts uniformly apply civil standard).
170. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), a securities fraud
damage action, the Court rejected a "clear and convincing" standard or any standard
more stringent than the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 390.
174. In the only two civil RICO cases that are known to have been tried to comple-
tion, B.F. Hirsh Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd in
part vacated in part, 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984), and Holmberg v. Morrisette &
Mintex Corp., No. 3-83-1383 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 1985) the preponderance of the evi-
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pending action ... ,175 RICO discovery exposes the activi-
ties of the defendant for a ten-year period in which the pattern
is alleged to have unfolded. 176 Moreover, the plaintiff is enti-
tled to discover any of the litany of offenses listed as predicate
acts under section 1961(1). This makes "relevant" discovery
unusually broad. 1
77
Rules 26 and 37 play a primary role in RICO discovery as
they do in all normal discovery, although Rule 37 sanctions for
noncompliance can play a dominant role in RICO cases. A
plaintiff pursuing a RICO claim can expect to meet formidable,
swift, and creative opposition to discovery in RICO cases.
RICO allegations often cause defense counsel to bristle and
respond ferociously and stubbornly to discovery requests.
This often necessitates court intervention, subsequent sanc-
tions, protective orders, and resulting procedural jockeying.
B. Limitations on Discovery
1. Rule 26 as a Limitation to its Own Broad Grant
Subdivision (c) of Rule 26 grants a court the potential power
to take away whatever Rule 26(b) allows a party to obtain in
discovery. Pursuant to Rule 26(c), the party can delimit the
scope and extent of discovery by seeking a protective order di-
recting, among other things, that discovery not be had, that it
be had only under specified terms and conditions, or that it be
limited to certain matters. 178 Rule 37 is the enforcement
mechanism through which discovery is modulated and regu-
lated. The recent amendment to Rule 26(b) has had particular
import in RICO actions since it instructs that discovery "shall
be limited by the court" if the court should find that the dis-
covery sought is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative," or
"unduly burdensome or expensive." The most interesting as-
pect of the new language is that it allows a court to act on its
own to protect against such abuses. The Advisory Committee
note to the 1983 Amendment to Rule 26 states that the pur-
pose of the amendment is "to encourage judges to be more
aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (imposing a ten-year requirement).
177. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 2.
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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overuse." 179 The recent amendment to Rule 26(b) is certain to
play a prominent role in RICO cases particularly as they
proliferate.
2. Sanctions Under Rule 37
As previously stated, Rule 37 operates as an enforcement
tool for courts monitoring discovery between parties. Rule
37(a) allows courts to issue orders compelling discovery, while
subdivision (b) allows it to fashion and impose appropriate
sanctions in response to a party's failure to comply with an or-
der that discovery be had.' 80 A number of sanctions exist in a
federal court's arsenal, each having a varying degree of sever-
ity. A common sanction is an order to stay the proceedings,
which has been tried in at least one RICO case.' 8 '
Another potential sanction is found in Rule 37(b)(2)(B)
which provides for "an order refusing to allow the disobedient
party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evi-
dence." 18 2 A court could conceivably prohibit a defendant
from testifying at trial on matters objected to or to which the
fifth amendment privilege was raised.'
8 3
The most draconian of all Rule 37 sanctions is the entry of
default or dismissal against a noncomplying party. Courts, for
obvious reasons, have reservations about exercising such a
remedy. The compunction to grant such an order is even
greater when the reason for noncompliance is the assertion of
the fifth amendment privilege. A default judgment was en-
tered by one district court where the court found the assertion
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) advisory committee comment to the 1983
amendment.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (a), (b).
181. Spencer Companies, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,361, 92,214 (D. Mass. 1982). In Spencer Companies, which involved RICO allega-
tions in the context of a corporate takeover, the court restricted the discovery process
until the plaintiff could demonstrate that the defendant had caused it a legally "com-
pensable injury." Id. at 92,217. The court in Spencer Companies was arguably well
outside the parameters of its discretion in staying the proceedings. Its decision may
have been supportable before Sedima, but certainly is not sustainable after Sedima
since many of the cloudy and inconsistent RICO interpretations relied upon by the
Spencer Companies court are now settled.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
183. Pollack, supra note 168, at 18.
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of the fifth amendment privilege was improper. 184 It cannot be
emphasized enough that litigators must be prepared to face
resistance to discovery and the concomitant need to request
sanctions in such cases.
C. Invocation of the Fifth Amendment
The potential invocation of the fifth amendment in RICO lit-
igation becomes an extremely important matter since the de-
fendant in civil RICO action may also be the defendant of a
subsequent or concurrent criminal RICO action. 185 The civil
discovery process seeks to illicit information that, if proven,
could also establish a criminal action. 186 For this reason, de-
fense counsel is wise to carefully consider whether the client
might need to assert the privilege despite the obvious stigma
attached to its exercise. Third-party witnesses might also have
occasion to invoke the fifth amendment during discovery.
Plaintiff's counsel must analyze whether discovery will be frus-
trated by a defendant's or third-party's assertion of the fifth
amendment.
Rule 26 excepts from its broad threshold for discovery mat-
ters which are privileged. 187 The fifth amendment has long
been held to apply to both civil and criminal proceedings
"wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal re-
sponsibility him who gives it."l18 Defendants may properly re-
fuse to comply with discovery requests where the responses
may tend to incriminate' 89 or furnish a line in a chain of evi-
dence that could incriminate. 190 As a corollary to the asser-
tion, the civil RICO plaintiff has no right to receive the
privileged information under Rule 26(b)(1).191
To be entitled to assert the privilege, the defendant must
show that a "possibility" of prosecution is presented. 192 A de-
184. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Limber,
647 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1981).
185. Pollack, supra note 168, at 5-6; see also IA re Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d 292,
293 (9th Cir. 1974) (right to assert privilege depends on possibility, not likelihood of
criminal prosecution).
186. Pollack, supra note 168, at 6.
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
188. McCarthy v. Arndsrein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
189. See Gitterman, 564 F. Supp. at 50.
190. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
191. Pollack, supra note 168, at 3.
192. Aaster Key Litig., 507 F.2d at 293.
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fendant cannot simply declare that the answer will incrimi-
nate. I9 3 A proper assertion requires the defendant to provide
a trial judge with sufficient information from which the judge
can make an intelligent evaluation of the claim.' 9 4 If the trial
court concludes that no threat of incrimination is present, then
the defendant must respond by demonstrating the danger of
incrimination. 195 Defendants are not simply protected from
discovery by making a blanket assertion of the privilege.
96
Objections to discovery must be specific.
19 7
193. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486; Brunswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 360
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1025 (1980).
194. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160.
195. See Baker, 647 F.2d at 917; United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
196. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Capitol Prods. Corp. v. Hernon, 457 F.2d
541, 542-43 (8th Cir. 1972);Jones v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213, 223
(D. Kan. 1979); Guy v. Abdulla, 58 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Gitterman, 564 F.
Supp. at 49.
The Sedima court settled the issue that a prior criminal conviction is not neces-
sary to make a RICO action. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284. It also settled the issue that a
competitive or indirect injury is not required to maintain standing in prosecuting a
civil RICO action. Id. The Supreme Court has also alluded that the "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt" standard is not applicable in civil RICO actions. Id. at 3282; see supra
notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has probably eliminated the requirement that there be a
nexus between organized crime and the RICO defendant in a civil RICO action.
These postulates were all presumed by the court in Spencer Companies when it ren-
dered its decision during the discovery in that case. Now that those postulates have
been dismantled by the Supreme Court in Sedima, the basis for the Spencer Companies
decision probably no longer exists. The Spencer Companies court was reacting nega-
tively to the broad reach of RICO instead of simply applying its provisions as written.
197. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
In United States v. Capetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975), a civil RICO action brought by the government, the defendant in-
sisted that plaintiffs had no right to take discovery following the invocation of the
fifth amendment and refused to appear at a deposition. The Seventh Circuit dis-
agreed holding that the defendants had no right to refuse to submit to questioning,
but stated that a defendant "has a right under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to
answer specific questions on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate
him." Capetto, 502 F.2d at 1359. In Gitterman, the court held that defendants are free
to object to discovery demands or to seek a protective order to preserve their fifth
amendment rights, but must make a specific demand or objection. Gitternman, 564 F.
Supp. at 50.
An attorney who believes his client could be indicted during or following a civil
lawsuit, should advise his client of his rights as one accused of a crime, the least of
which is the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. See Pollack, supra
note 168, at 11-13.
It is also interesting to note that in Cappetlo, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
[Vol. 12
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/3
TRIAL I4 J1YER'S GUIDE TO RICO
The fifth amendment privilege is obviously not available to a
defendant who has been convicted, 198 unless other related
charges could be filed. 199 If the court makes a formal grant of
immunity, the privilege may not be asserted.200 If the statute of
limitations on the criminal action has run, a defendant may not
assert the privilege either.20 1 Waiver of the privilege may be
important in civil RICO litigation. 20 2 Since the fifth amend-
ment is not self-executing, it must be affirmatively asserted or
waived. 2
03
Rule 37 sanctions may apply to a defendant's refusal to an-
swer questions based upon the fifth amendment, but the impo-
sition of sanctions cannot make the assertion of the privilege
costly. 20 4 As a result, a default or dismissal of the defendant's
case under RICO is unlikely when an apparently bona fide
claim of privilege is made under the fifth amendment. 20 5
Courts have shown a proclivity to stay the proceedings in
argument that a RICO civil action is essentially a criminal proceeding giving rise to
rights guaranteed in a criminal case. The court noted that § 1964 of RICO is reme-
dial and punitive in nature and is of the type traditionally granted by courts of equity.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1357.
198. See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973); United
States v. Romero, 249 F.2d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 1957) (convicted defendant can no
longer claim the fifth amendment privilege). One should bear in mind, however, the
different standards of proof between a criminal and civil action.
199. See I re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 619 F.2d 867, 871-72 (7th Cir.
1979).
200. See McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 42; Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 539 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
201. See United States v. Stewart, 445 F.2d 897, 900-01 (8th Cir. 1971).
202. See, e.g., Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472 (1972)
(discussion of what testimony can be compelled under grant of immunity); Hoffman
v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("privilege afforded not only extends to
answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces
those which would furnish a link . . . to prosecute"); United States v. Miranti, 253
F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (likelihood of prosecution does not affect right to invoke
privilege).
203. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "privileged" matter is not discoverable by parties to a civil proceeding.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
204. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37; see also Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (1951); Brunswick
Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981); Martin-
Trigona, 634 F.2d at 360 (pendency of criminal investigation not enough unless nexus
shown between information sought and criminal investigation). The Supreme Court,
in Hoffman, stated: "[tlo sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the impli-
cations of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to
the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result." Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87.
205. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 11-13.
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RICO cases as an alternative to default 20 6 or dismissal.2o 7 The
parties requesting the stay have the burden of demonstrating a
possibility that criminal proceedings are imminent. Further,
there is a burden to show the interrelationship between the ev-
idence sought in discovery with the evidence which could be
presented to prosecute a criminal RICO case. 20 8 If it is likely
that the relationship between the evidence in the civil and
criminal cases would damage the defendants, a stay is probably
appropriate.20
9
In the context of non-RICO cases, federal courts have al-
lowed a civil case to proceed and have instead precluded the
defendant from introducing the testimony or document sought
to be discovered. 210 This result is certainly a dubious ap-
proach since it makes the assertion of the privilege costly.2 "
1. Protective Orders and the Fifth Amendment Privilege
A litigant subjected to questions, the answers to which may
tend to incriminate, can bring a motion for a protective order
under Rule 26. The order can prevent discovery on certain
issues or questions or require discovery pursuant to specified
conditions. 212
To accommodate both parties, courts often order discovery.
The court may dictate who may be present at depositions or
document productions and may order records and transcripts
sealed.213 In addition, a court may order that certain matters
not be discussed with nonparties or witnesses under the threat
of contempt of court. Parties may also bring motions to deter-
206. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
207. See In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liab. Litig., 653 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1962).
208. See Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir.
1979).
209. One commmentator suggests that a partial stay of the proceedings may be a
desirable alternative to completely halting the discovery process. See Flynn, supra
note 168, at 14.
210. See Backos v. United States, 82 F.R.D. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
211. Cf Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967); ll'ehling, 608 F.2d at 1087
(court found no provision in Federal Discovery Rules to allow a court to impose sanc-
tions on a party making a valid claim of privilege); Backos, 82 F.R.D. at 745 (plaintiffs
hurt own claim because unable to introduce helpful evidence); Securities & Exch.
Comm'n v. American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
213. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 16. It is questionable whether a court has this
authority in the face of a fifth amendment privilege.
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mine whether such material is discoverable so that information
does not have to be introduced in open court.214
Rule 26 orders, of the variety discussed above, may be of
little value to the defendant asserting a fifth amendment privi-
lege since any disclosure of the information has the probability
of being leaked. Moreover, in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing, the federal government may gain access to such informa-
tion. The defendant may lose the benefits of civil
nondisclosure. 21 5 One commentator remarked on the poten-
tial danger of such disclosure pursuant to a Rule 26 order,
"[a]nother apparent weakness in such an order is that it relies
on the good faith and watchfulness of the parties to insure that
its purpose is met. Absent such care by the parties, the order
may well be of little value." 21 6 Practitioners whose clients must
assert the fifth amendment would be well-advised not to acqui-
esce in or accede to such arrangements and appeal such orders
should they be rendered by a court.
2. Use of Adverse Inferences Following a Fifth Amendment Assertion
If a defendant interposes the fifth amendment privilege to
refuse to answer questions in discovery or in testifying, it is
permissible for the plaintiff to argue to the jury and ask for jury
instructions that an adverse inference may be drawn from the
refusal.217 The most oft-cited case for this proposition is Baxter
v. Palmigiano,218 a non-RICO case, in which the United States
214. See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 F.2d
201, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1967).
215. Id.
216. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 16-17. Flynn states:
For instance, if incriminating information from allegedly closed proceedings
or sealed papers is leaked intentionally or negligently to outsiders, particu-
larly law enforcement officers, the defendant may be left exposed and with-
out a remedy adequate to protect him. Who is to be punished for the leak?
Should it be the client, the lawyer, a secretary, any one of whom may be
responsible? How will a contempt citation levied upon any of these individ-
uals help the defendant who now may face criminal charges? What can the
court do to help the defendant when the police in another jurisdiction, over
whom he has no control, have obtained the information in good faith with
no understanding that its release violated the court's order? It seems that
there is very little the court can do to provide a real substitute-not just an
arguable alternative to the exercise of the privilege under these circum-
stances. The so-called protective order may be no protection at all.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
217. See Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1979); Securities &
Exch. Comm'n v. Vesco, 16 FED. R. SERV. 2d 1237, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
218. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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Supreme Court held that it is "the prevailing rule that the fifth
amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties
to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to proba-
tive evidence offered against them . . "219 It is clear, follow-
ing Baxter and its progeny, that an adverse inference may be
drawn against a defendant. This can be a powerful tool to use
against a defendant in a RICO action.
Defense attorneys, however, are wise to argue that under the
unique facts of their case, the use of the inference takes a heavy
toll and deprives the defendant of his fifth amendment due
process rights. At least one court has held that it would be
unconstitutionally coercive to condition the exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination on the loss of substantial
economic interests.
220
Defense counsel representing a legal entity like a corpora-
tion or partnership must also ensure that the adverse inference
made is against the culpable individual and not the innocent
legal entity. Jury instructions may be necessary to clarify and
segregate against whom the jury is permitted to draw the ad-
verse inference.221 From a plaintiff's perspective, the threat of
the adverse inference should lend sobriety to and enhance set-
tlement negotiations.
D. Obtaining Discovery from Corporate Defendants
and the Government
1. Discovery from the Corporate or Similar Entity
Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
discovery from organizations, corporations, partnerships, un-
ions, associations, and other like entities. Attendance at depo-
sitions of an officer, director, managing agent, or other
persons who consent to testify is required. These persons
must be designated by the organization to testify.2 22 Since the
organization can only act through these individuals, their fail-
219. Id. at 318. See generally Daskal, Assertion of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Federal Civil Litigation: Rights and Remedies, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 243 (1980)
(discussion of ramifications of self-incrimination privilege in federal civil
proceedings).
220. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (allowing an adverse inference would substantially prejudice defendant's abil-
ity to defend).
221. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 18.
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
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ure to comply with discovery requests can result in sanctions
being imposed upon the organization under Rule 37.223 When
an officer, director, or managing agent does not appear at a
deposition, it is considered that the corporation has failed to
appear and the corporation will be sanctioned.
A corporation, as an entity, has no right to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege afforded individuals. When a corpora-
tion must appoint an agent to respond to discovery requests, it
must appoint a person who can answer without fear of self-
incrimination so that the discovery process is not frustrated.2 24
The corporation must turn over all information notwithstand-
ing the existence of the privilege for the individual officer, di-
rector, or agent. 225 The United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Kordel,226 has suggested that if the organization
cannot find an agent who can answer without self-incrimina-
tion, then the appropriate remedy is a protective order post-
poning civil discovery until the termination of the criminal
action. 227 If that argument is used by a corporation and its of-
ficer, director, or agent, the plaintiff's attorney's rejoinder is
that the corporate attorney must examine and furnish all re-
quested information and sign the interrogatories on behalf of
the corporation. 2
28
The size, organization, and structure of an organization may
dictate whether the fifth amendment privilege can functionally
protect the organization. In United States v. Bellis, 229 the United
States Supreme Court essentially held that when an organiza-
tion is small, loosely knit, and unorganized, it may be allowed
to assert the fifth amendment privilege and thwart discovery
since producing records and testimony may lead directly to
those individuals.230 To the extent a corporation is also small,
223. Cleveland v. Palmby, 75 F.R.D. 654, 656 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
224. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8 (1970). See also General Dynamics
Corp., 481 F.2d at 1204, 1210 (8th Cir. 1973) (designated agent must furnish to the
court all information known by its officers and employees which is imputed to the
corporation).
225. See In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 364, 368-69 (M.D. Pa.
1979); see also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946).
226. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
227. Id. at 8-9.
228. See Pollack, supra note 168, at 15.
229. 417 U.S. 885 (1974).
230. Id. at 892. The court in Bellis extended the rule to cover any organization
which "must be relatively well organized and structured and not merely a loose, in-
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loosely knit, and unorganized, the corporation may be the ben-
efactor of the fifth amendment asserted by an officer or
director.
The Court in Bellis differentiated between the officer forced
to provide information that might incriminate him and a mere
custodian who simply holds organization records. A custodian
has no right to refuse to produce documents of an organiza-
tion despite an assertion of the fifth amendment that those
records might incriminate him. 23' A custodian, however, may
not be compelled to reveal the location of the records which
may tend to incriminate him.
232
The real problem is encountered when an officer is re-
quested to testify and possesses information derived from his
capacity as an officer, but invokes the fifth amendment privi-
lege. This is problematic since the officer may be the only
practical source of information which could implicate both
himself and the corporation in a RICO case.
23 3
2. Discovery from the Government
a. The Freedom of Information Act
A plaintiff may seek to obtain information under the Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA") in which a federal govern-
ment agency must turn over documents in its possession
subject to FOIA's exceptions on confidentiality, investigative
records, or revealing sources of informants and other similar
exceptions.23 4 FOIA information requests may prove a fruitful
source of information for plaintiffs.
A government agency or agent may also be subpoenaed to
testify at trial, but each request is scrutinized by the United
States District Attorney in the district in which the testimony is
requested. FOIA criteria provide the guidelines for determin-
ing whether an exception applies or testimony will be allowed.
formal association of individuals. It must maintain a distinct set of organizational
records and recognize rights in its numbers of control and access to them." Id.
231. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
232. Id. at 128.
233. One court has responded to this situation by imposing sanctions on the cor-
poration itself since a failure to do so would be tantamount to allowing the corpora-
tion to benefit from the fifth amendment privilege. See Anthracite Coal, 82 F.R.D. at
368 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7).
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One author correctly suggests that a good relationship with
the local agency in the United States District Attorney's office
is important when requesting permission to allow an agency
and its agent to testify.235 The concern of the agency or the
United States District Attorney's office is generally not with the
testimony sought by the plaintiff on direct examination at trial.
The concern is that the process of investigation, identity of in-
formants, or other sensitive information could be inquired into
by the defendant on cross-examination, thereby unnecessarily
exposing the government to the risk of releasing such
information.
b. Discovery of Grand Jury Records Under Rule 6(e)
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern
the disclosure and release of federal grand jury records. The
presumption is against release of the records, and this policy is
in recognition of the secrecy afforded grand jury records.
23 6
To seek release of the records, a litigant must make a motion
before a federal district court judge itemizing the type of infor-
mation and, if possible, the specific documents sought.
As a preliminary and practical matter, the custodian of
records and the United States District Attorney who sought the
original indictment must be assured that the release of docu-
ments will not jeopardize the secrecy of the grand jury process
and its deliberations. Federal judges often closely follow, if
not adopt, the United States District Attorney's recommenda-
tions for release of grand jury documents. In a case where the
government has seized the business records of a corporation
for a criminal proceeding, a Rule 6(e) motion will be impera-
235. See Flynn, supra note 168, at 20. Flynn suggests:
As to testimony at depositions and at trial, the Department ofJustice guide-
lines admit a degree of flexibility to the government's response. A sub-
poena to testify is normally served upon the agency and the U.S. Attorney in
the district where the testimony is desired. Both then forward the request to
Washington through their own administrative channels. Each case is judged
on its merits though the criteria listed in the FOIA are still considered. The
recommendation of the local agency and the U.S. Attorney carry great
weight in the Justice Department's decision-making process.
Id. at 20-21.
236. The United States Supreme Court has permitted disclosure only if the parties
seeking it can show that the particular need for the disclosure outweighs the public
interest in continued secrecy. See United States v. Sells Eng'g Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424
(1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222-23 (1979); United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
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tive to procure basic documents needed for trial. The United
States District Attorney and the federal judge must be con-
vinced that the request will be circumscribed and will not re-
veal the grand jury process. 237
V. TRIAL STRATEGY
A practitioner must first decide between a bench or jury
trial. Many factors militate both for and against a jury trial. To
the extent plaintiff's counsel believes a RICO count will not
survive pre-trial or post-trial legal scrutiny, a jury would be im-
portant where punitive damages for common law fraud are al-
ternatively pled. A jury is not only adept at finding fraud, but
depending upon the seriousness of the conduct, can be gener-
ous in punitive damage awards. If a RICO count fails legally, a
punitive damage claim based upon common law fraud will still
be submitted to the jury.
A RICO count has the desirable effect for a plaintiff of some-
what tainting the jury before trial. A RICO case involves a no-
menclature full of criminal-type language and accusations and
the unsophisticated juror may be imbued with a feeling that a
normal commercial dispute which involves "technical" predi-
cate act violations, is indeed a criminal-type proceeding. This
may affect the jurors' outlook on the case from beginning to
end and unfairly burden the civil defendant. Federal judges
may, for precisely this reason, take great pains to counteract
that effect during voir dire, before trial instructions, and after
trial jury instructions.
A federal district court judge may have to wrestle with
whether to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, some combination of the
two, or a clear and convincing standard. A federal judge's con-
cern for the proper standard increases when a party wants to
impanel a jury. A judge may decide that portions of the case
will be under one standard and other portions will be under
another standard. Since it may be difficult to explain different
standards to a jury, a bench trial may be preferable.
RICO cases often involve complex schemes that are difficult
for a jury to understand. This may make a practitioner in-
237. One commentator suggests that a party may have easier access to business
records than testimonial documents presented to the grand jury. See Flynn, supra
note 168, at 23.
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clined to rely on a bench trial. The complicated nature of
RICO civil jury instructions also suggests that a bench trial is
best in a given case. 238 RICO civil jury instructions elongate
and complicate the court's jury instruction since RICO has so
many elements and sub-elements. These jury instructions are
in addition to instructions normally submitted in fraud, con-
version, or similar cases.
A bench trial is certainly shorter since a trial judge is not
reluctant to hear borderline or otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. A trial judge feels the admissibility of evidence can be
sorted out later in deliberations. A trial judge will act differ-
ently when a jury is sitting. The judge will take the time to
determine questions of admissibility when they arise at trial,
since the jury is not as well-equipped to sort out and disregard
potentially inadmissible evidence. This results in frequent in-
terruptions, side-bar conferences, recesses for in-chamber ar-
guments, and, in short, additional time and expense. After
trial and before the jury is instructed, attorneys will argue over
requested jury instructions, special verdict forms, and permis-
sible statements in closing arguments. A practitioner must
consider these factors before deciding to impanel a jury.
One final consideration is that not all civil fraud cases should
carry the imprimatur of a RICO allegation. A litigator should
be concerned that a RICO count may be met with hostility
from all sides and can lessen credibility with a court, thereby
affecting fully bona fide fraud claims. The treble damages, at-
torneys' fees, interest, costs, and disbursements attendant to a
claim are significant incentives to pleading a RICO case.
Those advantages, however, must be compared and realisti-
cally analyzed with the disadvantages.
A practitioner, in considering whether or not to allege a
RICO count, must also believe that there is truly a "pattern" of
racketeering activity. A "technical" pattern of two predicate
acts may not convince a trial court judge that a RICO claim is
justified. A litigator must establish a "practical" pattern that
satisfies both judge and jury that there truly has been a course
of wrongful and actionable conduct.
238. For sample civil RICO jury instructions, see Buffone, Model Civil RICO In-
structiois, RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION,
Tab F-8, at 1-10 (ABA Nat'l Inst. 1983). Please note that these model jury instruc-
tions are affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Sedinia.
1986]
51
DuVal: A Trial Lawyer's Guide: Everything You Always Wanted to Know abou
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA IV REVIEW
All of the above factors should go into the practitioner's
formula for addressing the viability and need for a jury or a
bench trial. The decision does not fit into a neat, schematic
pattern, but relies, for the most part, on the facts of each case
and the strength and character of the trial judge.
239
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted RICO to launch a full-scale attack on or-
ganized crime in the United States. Congress specifically
sought to enlist the aid of private citizens in that effort by offer-
ing private litigants treble damages if they were successful in
proving the underlying fraudulent acts necesssary to establish
a RICO cause of action. In addition, the aggrieved party in-
jured by fraudulent conduct is also able to recover interest,
costs, and attorneys' fees. RICO had its genesis in 1970 and is,
therefore, only fifteen years old. RICO's contours are not yet
finally defined since the statute has been utilized primarily as a
criminal statute by federal prosecutors in the first fifteen years
of its existence. It has only been roughly in the last five years
that private litigants have discovered RICO's utility in civil
actions.
The United States Supreme Court has recently clarified
some of the key areas of RICO, primarily through the Court's
decisions in Turkette and Sedima. Sedima eliminated the require-
ment that the defendant have previously committed a criminal
RICO offense as a prerequisite to initiating a civil RICO suit.
The plaintiff also does not have to show that he has suffered a
compensible injury separate from the injury caused by the
commission of the predicate acts.
Despite the liberal reading given RICO by the Supreme
Court, not all fraud actions can or should form the basis for a
RICO count. RICO is a powerful weapon in terms of both
monetary and reputational damage. Courts remain hostile to
RICO, and only cases with the strongest fact patterns will sur-
vive attack from both the defendant and the bench.
One way to strengthen a RICO claim is through proper
pleading. Litigators should always be mindful of Rule 9 mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a claim with particularity
and Rule 12 motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
239. Moran, supra note 4, at 779-89.
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which relief can be granted. Litigants must also be prepared
for the rush of motions, discovery protective orders, and hos-
tility that will be generated by pleading a RICO claim. If one
can anticipate this hostility in advance, RICO can be a potent
weapon for aggrieved fraud victims. It is a statute that is long
overdue.
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